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POWER IMBALANCES IN COLLEGE 
ATHLETICS AND AN EXPLOITED STANDARD:  
IS TITLE IX DEAD? 
Without a doubt, Title IX has opened the doors of opportunity for 
generations of women and girls to compete, to achieve, and to pursue their 
American Dreams.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since 1972, a long line of decisions by federal courts has watered 
down Title IX so that it no longer serves the purpose for which it was 
designed.  The courts have failed to enforce Title IX in accordance with 
its legislative goals, and the hierarchical power imbalances existing in 
college athletics increase the danger of an exploited standard.  These 
problems hinder efforts aimed at preventing sexual harassment, and 
merge to expose vulnerable athletes to a risk of harassment with no 
feasible contacts to whom they can report such harassment.  To illustrate, 
consider the following: 
A college junior secures her position again as the star pitcher on her 
successful college softball team.  Most likely, the majority of the coaches 
and other personnel are male.  After a tough loss for the star pitcher, the 
head coach confronts her, explaining to her that in order to retain her 
position, she needs to meet with him privately for personal pitching 
lessons.  The young woman agrees, sensing that if she refused she would 
find herself at the end of the bench.  During these lessons, the coach 
makes suggestive comments, asks increasingly vulgar questions about 
her sexual history, and begins to suggestively touch her.  She tries to 
make clear to her coach that she is there only for softball, but the coach 
disregards her objections and continues his harassment. 
The pitcher is worried about playing time, so she does not want to 
report her coach to anyone.  Even if she did want to report him, she is 
not sure where she would go.  The pitcher finally goes to the assistant 
athletic director to report the inappropriate behavior.  The assistant 
athletic director listens to the pitcher and advises her to stop 
encouraging the coach, who is one of the best coaches in the country.  
                                                 
1 U.S. Secretary of Education Rod Paige, June 2002 “Open to all”: Title IX at Thirty, The 
Secretary of Education’s Commission on Opportunity in Athletics, U.S. Department of 
Education, Washington D.C. (Feb. 23, 2003), http://www.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/ 
athletics/title9report.doc (last visited Oct. 10, 2007) (emphasis in original).  See also David S. 
Cohen, Limiting Gebser:  Institutional Liability for Non-Harassment Sex Discrimination Under 
Title IX, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 311, 312 (2004).  The Secretary of Education’s report was 
reflective of the general public’s view that Title IX is synonymous with sports because 
President Bush limited the Commission’s focus to athletics equity.  Id. 
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The athletic director relays these comments to the coach in the form of an 
informal verbal warning. 
At the end of the season, the star pitcher is emotionally distraught 
and decides against playing summer ball for the coach, in effect ending 
her dream of playing professionally.  She brings a Title IX claim for 
sexual harassment against the school.  The trial court grants summary 
judgment for the school district because the assistant athletic director 
was not the proper person to receive notice, and because the warning 
issued showed that the school was not indifferent.  The very legislation 
that was enacted to foster equality in athletics and education has been 
watered down, consequently allowing the harassment of this young 
pitcher because she is at the bottom of a dangerous power hierarchy. 
Because of the distorted way in which the Court has interpreted Title 
IX and the power imbalances inherent in the college athletic world, 
schools are able to dodge legal liability by promulgating reactive 
regulations that meet minimal national requirements.  According to the 
Supreme Court, Title IX can give rise to a private right of action for 
monetary damages against a recipient of federal funds.2  However, the 
Court has held that damages are only recoverable if the victim can 
establish the school had actual notice of, and was deliberately indifferent 
to, harassment that is so pervasive, severe, and objectively offensive that 
it deprives the student or athlete of her educational benefits or activities.3  
In addition, college athletic teams are marked by power imbalances, with 
players at the bottom of the power structure.4  As a result, Title IX does 
not prevent sexual harassment in the hierarchical college athletic world.   
This power structure makes the athletic team an environment ripe 
for sexually harassing behavior that goes unreported.  This weakened 
standard under Title IX and the power imbalance inherent in college 
athletics allow many schools to avoid liability in the face of clear sexual 
harassment, especially in the close-knit world of college athletics.5  
Schools are allowed to adopt purely reactive measures; consequently, 
not enough attention is given to the development of proactive policies to 
                                                 
2 See infra Parts II.A–B (articulating the legal test for federal funds recipient liability). 
3 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998) (setting forth the 
actual notice and deliberate indifference standard); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 
526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999) (explaining the severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive 
requirement).   
4 See infra Part III.B (exploring the depth of the power imbalance between a coach and 
player, as well as other members of the athletic staff and the athlete). 
5 See infra Part III.C (discussing the interplay between a weak legal standard and the 
power imbalances in college athletics that lead to legal loopholes schools may use to 
circumvent liability for sexual harassment).   
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prevent this harassment from ever occurring.6  The purpose of this Note 
is to show that the judicially created standard for determining school 
liability for sexual harassment under Title IX distorts the congressional 
intent behind the statute and should be modified to accurately reflect the 
true intent underlying Title IX.  In addition, school policies must be 
changed in order to reflect the obstacles presented by the inherent power 
structure of college athletics.   
Part II of this Note explores the complicated legislative and judicial 
history of Title IX, with special emphasis on its use in the world of 
college athletics.7  Part III analyzes the inherent power imbalances in 
college athletics and the easily twisted standard for school liability, 
which encourages the formulation of merely reactive institutional 
procedural safeguards.8  Part IV presents several proposed changes to 
the standard and suggests additions to the existing regulations 
implementing and enforcing Title IX that will create a strong set of 
community standards and help prevent sexual harassment in college 
athletics.9   
II.  BACKGROUND OF TITLE IX 
In order to understand the importance of Title IX, one must first 
understand its complicated history.  Part II.A of this Note provides 
background information regarding the birth of the bill and general 
legislative history behind its passage.10  Part II.B analyzes the pertinent 
Supreme Court cases that have established a private cause of action with 
the right to damages within Title IX.11  Part II.C explains the specific test 
                                                 
6 See 34 C.F.R. § 106.9 (2003) (explaining regulatory requirements promulgated by the 
Department of Education Office for Civil Rights); § 106.31(b) (2003) (discussing the 
corrective measure a school is to take upon receiving notice that sexual harassment has 
occurred).   
7 See infra Part II (discussing the history of Title IX, from Senator Bayh’s original idea to 
the most recent cases interpreting liability of a school under Title IX).   
8 See infra Part III (explaining that the existence of power imbalances on a college 
athletic team, in conjunction with the exploited Gebser standard, effectively eliminates the 
prevention and reporting of sexual harassment in college athletics). 
9 See infra Part IV (proposing several changes to the standard and several additional 
regulations the Department of Education should promulgate to encourage creating an 
institution that values preventing sexual harassment on its athletic teams). 
10 See infra Part II.A (examining the origins of Title IX and the administrative regulations 
that followed, and demonstrating the intent of Title IX and the widening class of persons 
and harms covered by Title IX). 
11 See infra Part II.B (tracking the interpretation of Title IX through several Supreme 
Court cases). 
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that has evolved for use in sexual harassment cases and examines 
specific examples of when this standard has been applied.12   
A. The Legislative Promise of Title IX 
In 1971, Senator Birch Bayh introduced the first version of the bill 
that would become Title IX.13  Senator Bayh, in his efforts to get the bill 
passed, denounced the prevalence of sex discrimination in education:  
“[O]ne of the great failings of the American educational system is the 
continuation of corrosive and unjustified discrimination against 
women.”14  On June 23, 1972, Congress enacted a law that would forever 
change the face of public education.15  Prior to the enactment of Title IX, 
many educational institutions were free to discriminate against women 
and girls.16  Title IX was enacted as part of the 1972 Education 
Amendments, and provides the following protection:   
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
                                                 
12 See infra Part II.C (discussing the standard put forward in Gebser, and clarified in 
Franklin, that has diverged from Congress’s intent behind the language of Title IX). 
13 117 Cong. Rec. 30,399 (1971) (noting that the original amendment to the Education Act 
focused on increased access to higher and graduate education). 
14 118 Cong. Rec. 5802-03 (1972).  Senator Bayh continued, “It is clear to me that sex 
discrimination reached into all facets of education—admissions, scholarship programs, 
faculty hiring and promotion, professional staffing, and pay scales.”  Id.  Available statistics 
supplement Senator Bayh’s statement:  in 1972, fewer than 32,000 women competed in 
intercollegiate athletics.  Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Policy 
Interpretation, 45 C.F.R. pt. 86 (1979);  see also Eldon E. Snyder & Elmer Spreitzer, 
Participation in Sport as Related to Educational Expectations among High School Girls, 50 
BOWLING GREEN ST. UNIV. SOCIOLOGY OF EDUC. 47, (1977).  Even as early as 1968, 
researchers established that athletic participation is positively related to academic 
achievement and to educational expectations.  Id.  According to the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association, Title IX has had a positive impact on the number of college women 
participating in competitive athletics; it is now nearly five times the pre-Title IX rate.  
NATION COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION (NCAA), 1981-82–2005-06 NCAA SPORTS 
SPONSORSHIP AND PARTICIPATION RATES REPORT 76 (May 2007), available at 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/Uploads/PDF/ PariticipationRates20084232c5b7-6441-
412c-80f1-7d85f3536a51.pdf.In 2005-06, a record number of 170,526 women competed, 
representing 42% of college athletes nationwide.  Id. 
15 Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).  Title IX was enacted as part 
of the Education Amendments of 1972, that, as a whole, dealt with rising educational costs, 
increased student enrollment, and the changing work world.  Id. § 1681.   
16 “Open to All”, supra note 1.  This report attributes the remarkable increase in female 
participation since Title IX to both the legislation and changing ideas about women’s 
“proper” role in society.  Id.   
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education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance[.]17 
Sexual harassment was not itself mentioned in the congressional 
debates or text of Title IX because Title IX was originally intended only 
to combat sexual discrimination.18  However, since the passage of Title 
IX, administrative regulations promulgated by the Department of 
Education’s Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”) have further defined sexual 
discrimination, clarified exactly which classes of individuals are 
protected, and indicated that the scope of behavior Title IX was intended 
to remedy includes sexual harassment.19  In order to continue receiving 
federal funds, a school must comply with Title IX and the Department of 
                                                 
17 20 U.S.C. § 1681.  This statute continues to describe groups and settings where 
discrimination is allowed, for example, religious organizations with contrary religious 
tenets, military training schools, public schools with continuing traditions of only 
admitting one sex, social fraternities or sororities, voluntary youth organizations, Boy or 
Girl conferences, mother-daughter or father-son activities, beauty pageants, or situations 
involving statistical evidence of imbalance.  Id. § 1681(a)(2)-(9).  See 118 Cong. Rec. at 5803.  
The sponsor of the bill, Senator Bayh, described the bill, stating that “[Title IX] is 
broad . . . [T]he heart of this amendment is a provision banning sex discrimination in 
educational programs receiving Federal funds.  The amendment would cover such crucial 
aspects as admissions procedures, scholarships, and faculty employment, with limited 
exceptions.”  Id.  See also Recognizing the Contributions of Patsy Takemoto Mink, Pub. L. 
No. 107-255, 116 Stat. 1734 (2002) (indicating that Title IX may be called the Patsy 
Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act).   
18 Cohen, supra note 1, at 314.  See 34 C.F.R. § 106.40 (2003).  Instead, the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare concentrated on the classes of people eligible for protection 
from discrimination.  Id.  See also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74 
(1992).  Indeed, it took two decades for the Supreme Court to recognize the application of 
Title IX to sexual harassment.  Id. 
19 See Cohen, supra note 1, at 313;  see also 34 C.F.R. §106.40 (2007) (Title IX includes 
protection against discrimination based on pregnancy and marital status); 34 C.F.R. §100.7 
(2003) (incorporating the following retaliatory language taken from Title VII:  “No recipient 
or other person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate against any individual for 
the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege . . . because he has made a complaint, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing 
under this part.”).  See also 34 C.F.R. §106.41 (2007).  As the following excerpt demonstrates, 
discrimination can extend to the availability of certain sports to each gender:   
[A] recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of 
each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill 
or the activity involved is a contact sport.  However, where a recipient 
operates or sponsors . . . no such team for members of the other sex, 
and athletic opportunities for members of that sex have previously 
been limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-out 
for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport.  For 
the purposes of . . . [these Title IX regulations], contact sports include 
boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other 
sports the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact.   
Id. 
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Education’s Title IX regulatory implementation scheme.20  The 
regulations establish procedures that are important for the prevention or 
correction of sexual harassment, including establishment of a public 
policy against sex discrimination,21 adoption and publication of 
grievance procedures addressing sex discrimination and harassment,22 
and designation of at least one employee responsible for Title IX 
compliance.23  Unfortunately, many colleges and universities have 
focused on enacting reactive measures that allow the school to avoid 
                                                 
20 Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance [hereinafter Revised Guidance]:  Harassment of 
Students by School Employees, Other Students or Third Parties: Title IX, Department of 
Education Office for Civil Rights, Jan. 19, 2001, 
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2008).  
See 20 U.S.C. § 3413 (2000).  Since the passage of Title IX, Congress created a separate 
federal agency responsible for education, the Department of Education, with an 
enforcement division—the Office of Civil Rights.  Id.  Congress transferred all educational 
responsibilities, which had belonged to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
to the newly created agency.  Id. § 3441. 
21 34 C.F.R. § 106.9 (2006).  Such a policy must be publicly disseminated through 
magazines, newspapers, and other memoranda distributed to students, teachers, coaches, 
and other staff members.  Id.  This section of the C.F.R. states in part as follows:   
Each recipient shall implement specific and continuing steps to notify 
applicants for admission and employment, students and parents of 
elementary and secondary school students, employees, sources of 
referral of applicants for admission and employment, and all unions 
or professional organizations holding collective bargaining or 
professional agreements with the recipient, that it does not 
discriminate on the basis of sex in the educational program or activity 
which it operates, and that it is required by title IX and this part not to 
discriminate in such a manner. 
Id. 106.9(a)(1). 
22 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (2006).  As the following section sets forth, a federal funds 
recipient must designate a specific employee responsible for coordinating Title IX 
compliance and provide formalized grievance procedures: 
(a) Designation of responsible employee.  Each recipient shall 
designate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply 
with and carry out its responsibilities under this part, including any 
investigation of any complaint communicated to such recipient 
alleging its noncompliance with this part or alleging any actions 
which would be prohibited by this part.  The recipient shall notify all 
its students and employees of the name, office address and telephone 
number of the employee or employees appointed pursuant to this 
paragraph.   
(b) Complaint procedure of recipient.  A recipient shall adopt and 
publish grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable 
resolution of student and employee complaints alleging any action 
which would be prohibited by this part.   
Id. § 106.8(a)–(b). 
23 Id. § 106.8(a).  See supra note 22; infra Part IV (discussing the OCR recommendations in 
comparison with this Note’s suggested additions).   
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legal liability; however, these procedures are inadequate because they do 
not take into account the existing power imbalances.24  The Department 
of Education is the agency responsible for the enforcement of Title IX, 
including enforcement in the hierarchical world of college athletics.25   
In 2001, the Assistant Secretary of the OCR issued a Revised 
Guidance providing standards for compliance that the OCR applies in 
investigating Title IX sexual harassment claims and enforcing Title IX.26  
This Guidance is intended to inform educational employees and officials 
how to identify sexual harassment of a student and take steps to address 
it.27  Finally, the Guidance provides ideal standards to be applied when 
investigating or attempting to resolve a sexual harassment claim.28  In 
1979, seven years after Title IX was passed, the Supreme Court first held 
that like Title VII, Title IX could give rise to a private right of action.29   
B. Broken Promises:  Early Jurisprudential Interpretation of Title IX 
1. A Private Right of Action Extended to Sexual Harassment 
In 1979, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, the Supreme Court first 
held that Title IX created a private right of action for sexual 
                                                 
24 See infra Part III.C (explaining the way in which the exploited Gebser standard 
combines with a power imbalance in college athletics to allow institutions to enact reactive 
policies that do not advance the purpose of Title IX). 
25 20 U.S.C. §§ 3413, 3441.   
26 Revised Guidance, supra note 20. 
27 Id.  The Guidance also gives a helpful description of the real purpose behind 
preventing harassment:   
Through its enforcement of Title IX, OCR has learned that a significant 
number of students, both male and female, have experienced sexual 
harassment, that sexual harassment can interfere with a student's 
academic performance and emotional and physical well-being, and 
that preventing and remedying sexual harassment in schools is 
essential to ensure nondiscriminatory, safe environments in which 
students can learn. 
Id. 
28 See Revised Guidance, supra note 20.  In explaining harassment by teachers and other 
employers, the Revised Guidance states,  “Schools are responsible for taking prompt and 
effective action to stop the harassment and prevent its recurrence.”  Id. at V.B.1.  The Court 
limited the liability standards established in Gebser and Davis to private actions for 
monetary damages.  See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 284 (1998) 
(setting the standard for school liability in private litigation); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. 
Of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 639 (1999) (clarifying the standard).  Administrative enforcement 
standards reflected in the 1997 and 2000 Revised Guidance remain valid in OCR 
enforcement actions.  Guidance, supra note 20, at Preamble.   
29 See infra Parts II.B.1–2 (discussing several of the Supreme Court cases to first interpret 
Title IX). 
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discrimination.30  The Court reasoned that Title IX had two related, yet 
separate, objectives.31  First, Congress wanted to avoid using federal 
monies to support discrimination.32  Second, Congress aimed to protect 
individuals against sexual discrimination.33   
The next pertinent decision in the Title IX line of cases is Franklin v. 
Gwinnett County Public Schools, a case considering the application of Title 
                                                 
30 Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979).  In Cannon, Justice Stevens wrote for the 
majority and held that a woman who was denied admission to medical school at two 
private universities had a private right of action under Title IX for sex-based 
discrimination.  Id. at 680, 717.  The Court reasoned that Congress’s failure to specify a 
private right to action did not mean that it did not intend for there to be such a remedy 
available to the persons protected by Title IX.  Id. at 717.  In fact, all of the surrounding 
circumstances that the Court has previously identified as supportive of an implied remedy 
were present in this case, and the Court therefore found that the woman could maintain 
her suit, even though the private right of action was not specifically enumerated in Title IX.  
Id.   
31 Id. at 704.  U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Coordination and Review 
Section, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/coord/titleix.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2008).  The 
United States Department of Justice states that “[t]he principle objective of Title IX is to 
avoid the use of federal money to support sexually discriminatory practices in education 
programs such as sexual harassment and employment discrimination, and to provide 
individual citizens effective protection against those practices.”  Id.   
32 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.  See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Coordination 
and Review Section, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/coord/titleix.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 
2008).  The administrative regulations further this goal as well, as Verna Williams, Vice 
President and Director of Educational Opportunities at the National Women’s Law Center, 
pointed out:  “The new regulation is key to making the promise of Title IX a reality.   It 
provides the executive branch agencies with the tool they need to reach the persistent 
problems that make gender equity elusive—like disparities in career education 
programming and sexual harassment, for example.”  Id.      
33 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.  This was very similar to the reasons put forth for the private 
cause of action in Title VI.  Id.  When speaking about Title VI, Representative Lindsay 
commented,   
Everything in this proposed legislation has to do with providing a 
body of law which will surround and protect the individual from some 
power complex.  This bill is designed for the protection of individuals.  
When an individual is wronged he can invoke the protection to 
himself, but if he is unable to do so because of economic distress or 
because of fear then the Federal Government is authorized to invoke 
that individual protection for that individual[.] 
110 Cong Rec. 1540 (1964).  This should be compared with the following Title IX comments 
made by Representative Mink regarding women as individuals with rights:   
Any college or university which has [a] ... policy which discriminates 
against women applicants . . . is free to do so under [Title IX] but such 
institutions should not be asking the taxpayers of this country to pay 
for this kind of discrimination.  Millions of women pay taxes into the 
Federal treasury and we collectively resent that these funds should be 
used for the support of institutions to which we are denied equal 
access.   
177 Cong. Rec. 38252 (1971).   
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IX to sexual harassment.34  In Franklin, teachers and administrators were 
aware of student harassment by a teacher-coach but did nothing to stop 
it, and even went so far as to discourage the victim from pursuing legal 
remedies against the perpetrator.35  The Court framed the issue as 
whether a high school student could seek monetary damages under Title 
IX for alleged intentional gender-based discrimination in connection 
with sexual harassment and abuse by a teacher-coach.36  The Court held 
in the affirmative.37  Justice Scalia joined in the Court’s analysis of 
Franklin, but wrote that when rights of action are judicially implied, 
“categorical limitations . . . may be judicially implied as well.”38  Franklin, 
                                                 
34 Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992).  Christine Franklin was a 
high school student subjected to continual sexual harassment beginning in the fall of her 
sophomore year by Andrew Hill, an athletics coach and teacher at the school.  Id. at 63.  The 
case states that “Franklin avers that Hill engaged her in sexually-oriented conversations in 
which he asked about her sexual experiences with her boyfriend and whether she would 
consider having sexual intercourse with an older man.”  Id.  Franklin also alleged that “Hill 
forcibly kissed her on the mouth in the school parking lot,” and that he called her at home 
to ask her on a date.  Id.  Finally, the allegations included three occurrences during 
Franklin’s junior year, in which Hill interrupted her class, requested that the teacher excuse 
her, and forced Franklin to have sex with him in a private school office.  Id.  Although other 
teachers and administrators had notice of, and in fact had already begun the investigation 
of Hill, they did nothing to stop his sexual harassment and actually “discouraged Franklin 
from pressing charges against Hill.”  Id. at 64.  Hill resigned from his position, and the 
school thereupon closed its investigation.  Id. 
35 Id.  The teacher-coach resigned, and the school dropped all investigation into the 
matter.  Id.  Both the district and appeals courts dismissed charges before the Supreme 
Court accepted certiorari from the Eleventh Circuit in 1992.  Id. at 64–65.  The Court found 
that the damages available should not be limited to back-pay and prospective relief 
because such remedies would be inadequate as the student no longer attended the school 
and the teacher-coach no longer was employed at that school.  Id. at 75–76.   
36 Id. at 62–63.  The Franklin majority repeatedly referred to the sanctioned relief as 
“monetary damages[.]”  Id. at 76.  Although the Court did not define this term, it did 
specifically reject limiting Title IX monetary relief to that which is equitable in nature, such 
as compensation for back-pay.  Id. 
37 Id. at 62.  The Court relied on established cases to hold that all appropriate remedies 
should be available unless Congress has indicated otherwise.  Id. at 66; see also Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 670, 684 (1946).  In Marbury, Chief Justice 
Marshall noted that this government “has been emphatically termed a government of laws, 
and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish 
no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163.  This idea dates 
back to English common law.  See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES 23 (1783); see 
also Ashby v. White, 1 Salk. 19, 21, Eng.Rep. 808, 816 (1702).  In addition, the reasoning 
used in Bell was nothing new, as from the earliest years of the judiciary, the power to 
award damages to redress injuries in federal court has existed.  Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66.  “As 
Bell indicates, “[W]here legal rights have been invaded, . . . federal courts may use any 
available remedy to make good the wrong done.”  Bell, 327 U.S. at 684.   
38 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 77–78 (Scalia, J., concurring).  However, the Rehabilitation Act 
Amendments of 1986 serve as an implicit acknowledgment that damages are available and 
must be read “as a validation of Cannon’s holding[.]”  Id. at 72 (quoting the majority).  See 
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when taken as a whole, stands for the proposition that “a damages 
remedy is available for an action brought to enforce Title IX.”39  Franklin 
was a precursor to Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, decided 
eight years later, which announced a stiff standard to determine 
institutional liability for sexual harassment in school or school-sponsored 
extracurricular activities such as athletics.40 
2. Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District Sets the Standard for 
Liability 
Gebser was the next step in the Supreme Court’s Title IX 
jurisprudence regarding when an institution may be held liable for 
damages for an implied right of action under Title IX for sexual 
harassment of a student by one of the institution’s teachers.41  The sexual 
                                                                                                             
42 U.S.C. § 200d-7(a)(2).  See also Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72.  Justice Scalia points out that 
Congress abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title IX, Title VI, 
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975.  Id.  It is on 
this basis that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas concur in the final disposition of 
the majority.  Id. at 76.  See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575–76 (1979); 
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18, 23, Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72.  
See also Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191 (1988) (asserting that the Court perhaps 
should abandon the whole idea of implied rights of action).   
39 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the 
difference between OCR agency enforcement and the standard for liability in private 
litigation).   
40 Cohen, supra note 1, at 328.  See Revised Guidance, supra note 20.  While the line of 
cases addressed in this Note is concerned with monetary damages and injunctive relief for 
the plaintiff, the Department of Education regulations have a slightly different purpose:  
“In contrast, the process of administrative enforcement requires enforcement agencies such 
as OCR to make schools aware of potential Title IX violations and to seek voluntary 
corrective action before pursuing fund termination or other enforcement mechanisms.”  Id. 
at Preamble.    
41 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist, 524 U.S. 274 (1998).  As a thirteen-year-old, 
Alida Star Gebser participated in a book discussion club led by local high school teacher 
Waldrop.  Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1224 (5th Cir. 1997).  Gebser 
was a student at Lago Vista middle school, while Waldrop was a teacher at the Lago Vista 
high school.  Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.  Gebser participated in these book discussions because 
she was intellectually ahead of her class and Waldrop’s wife was her eighth grade teacher, 
who suggested she meet with her husband’s group.  Doe, 106 F.3d at 1223.  During the 
course of these meetings, Waldrop made sexually suggestive comments to the group of 
students.  Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.  The next fall, when Gebser had Waldrop as a teacher, he 
continued to make sexually suggestive comments to the class, and to Gebser in particular 
when they were alone in his classroom.  Id. at 77–78.  Waldrop initiated actual sexual 
contact with Gebser in the spring, kissing her and fondling her while at her house under 
the pretense of returning a book.  Id. at 278.  The two had sexual intercourse a number of 
times over the remainder of that year, the summer, and into the next school year.  Id.  They 
often had sex during class time, although never on school property.  Id. at 279-80.  The 
focus of the Gebser decision was which standard should be applied in determining liability 
in teacher-student harassment cases.  Id.  The topic of student sexual harassment has also 
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harassment at issue in this case took place in the context of book 
discussions and was reported by several classroom parents to the school 
guidance counselor, but not to the superintendent who was also the Title 
IX coordinator.42  A few months later, a police officer discovered the 
teacher in question and a student having sex; the teacher was arrested 
and Lago Vista terminated his employment.43   
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that school districts are not 
liable for a Title IX violation unless an employee with supervisory power 
over the offending employee actually knew of the abuse, had the power 
to end it, and failed to do so.44  At that time, there were many different 
existing methods for assessing a school district’s liability under Title IX 
for a teacher’s abuse of a student; however, this was one of the most 
restrictive methods.45   
                                                                                                             
been extensively discussed in scholarly works and cases.  See, e.g., Rowinsky v. Bryan 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447 
(9th Cir. 1995); Daniel B. Tukel, Student Versus Student:  School District Liability for Peer 
Sexual Harassment, 75 MICH. BAR J. 1154 (1996).   
42 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 278.  Gebser did not report this activity to school officials, stating 
that she did not want to lose Waldrop as a teacher.  Id.  Later that year, two parents of other 
students complained to the high school principal about Waldrop’s comments during class.  
Id.  Waldrop was reprimanded by school officials and apologized to the parents, saying he 
did not think he had said anything offensive but promised it would not happen again.  Id.  
See Revised Guidance, supra note 20, at IX.  The Guidance given by the Department of 
Education indicates that each school system should have Title IX Coordinator, responsible 
for implementing and overseeing any Title IX programs.  Id.  See infra Parts III.C (analyzing 
existing policies); Part IV.B (proposing additional procedures and proactive measures).  
43 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 278.  As the dissent emphasized, this case presents a clear example 
of abuse that was made possible, effectuated, and repeated over a prolonged period 
because of the powerful influence that Waldrop had over Gebser by reason of the authority 
that the school district had delegated to him.  Id. at 299 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  See infra 
Part II.B (discussing power structures in athletics). 
44  Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997).  The Lago Vista 
Indep. Sch. Dist. Court’s reasoning regarding liability was based on Rosa H. v. San Elizario 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997).  Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d at 1225–
26.  In affirming the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the school district, the 
Fifth Circuit held that neither a vicarious agency liability theory nor a strict liability theory 
was the proper standard for determining a school’s liability for teacher-student 
harassment.  Id.  See also Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(the Fifth Circuit held a school district is not absolutely liable because strict liability is not 
part of the Title IX contract).  The court continued, in opposition to a strong dissent and 
contrary to OCR policy, that a school district was not liable for the sexual molestation of a 
second grade student by one of her teachers because the student and her mother only 
reported the harassment to the student’s homeroom teacher.  Id.  It further determined that 
notice to the teacher was not notice to the school—notwithstanding the fact that a school 
handbook instructed students and parents to report complaints to the child’s homeroom 
teacher.  Id.   
45 Cohen, supra note 1, at 328; see also Kinman v. Omaha Public Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 
468–69 (8th Cir. 1996) (summarizing the four standards of Title IX liability used by various 
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gebser, and 
Justice O’Connor wrote for the majority in a five to four decision.46  The 
Court affirmed the lower court’s decision and laid out the applicable 
standard, holding that “damages may not be recovered in those 
circumstances unless an official of the school district who at a minimum 
has authority to institute corrective measures on the district's behalf has 
actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher’s 
misconduct.”47  The majority reaffirmed that, in Title IX jurisprudence, 
the private right of remedy is judicially implied and there is no 
expressed legislative intention on the scope of remedies available.48  
Therefore, a court has a measure of latitude in deciding these issues.49  
                                                                                                             
district courts in 1996:  “(1) agency principles of negligence or recklessness; (2) knowledge 
or direct involvement by the school district; (3) Title VII's ‘knew or should have known’ 
standard; and (4) strict liability.”).  See generally Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry Twp., 128 
F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997) (in which the Seventh Circuit refused to impute a teacher’s actions 
to a School District or School Board, applying an actual knowledge standard); Kracunas v. 
Iona Coll., 119 F.3d 80, 88 (2d Cir. 1997)  (noting that both actual and constructive notice 
requirements exist for purposes of imposing Title IX liability on a college or university for 
sexual harassment); Doe v. Claiborne County, 103 F.3d 495, 513–15 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(discussing the supervisory liability standard used in dismissal of Title IX claims).  
46 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284.  See Richard L. Wiener & Linda A. Hunt, Clarifying Cases of 
Sexual Harassment, 29 AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N MONITOR ONLINE at 12, (Dec. 1998), 
available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/dec98/jnotehtml.  See also U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
Civil Rights Division Title IX Legal Manual, Jan. 11, 2001, Pt. IV.D.2.  In one term, the 
United States Supreme Court held that employers were strictly liable for supervisors who 
committed sexual harassment, while at the same time narrowed the protection available for 
students who file similar claims.  Id. As civil rights law has evolved, the definition of sexual 
harassment has remained largely the same under Title VII and Title IX, but the legal 
standards for determining liability for monetary damages under the two statutes are 
different.  Id.  Under Title IX, a school must be deliberately indifferent in the face of actual 
knowledge of the harassment in order to be liable.  Id.  In contrast, under Title VII, an 
employer may be liable for money damages, under certain circumstances, for a 
supervisor’s harassment of a subordinate, even without notice.  Id.  Cf. Meritor Sav. Bank 
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (holding that absence of notice to an employer does 
not insulate the employer from liability).   
47 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277 (emphasis added).  In addition, “[w]here a school district's 
liability rests on actual notice principles, however, the knowledge of the wrongdoer himself 
is not pertinent to the analysis.”  Id. at 291.  But see Gebser, 524 U.S. at 299 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“The fact that he did not prevent his own harassment of Gebser is the 
consequence of his lack of will, not his lack of authority.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF AGENCY § 280  (The Court seems to leave the door open for Congress to act, 
proclaiming,  “Until Congress speaks directly on the subject, however, we will not hold a 
school district liable for damages under Title IX for a teacher’s sexual harassment of a 
student absent actual notice and deliberate indifference.”) (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292–
93); see infra Part IV (proposing changes to the standard for liability under Title IX). 
48 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284.   
49 Id.  This scope of remedies includes monetary damages.  Id.  The dissent takes issue 
with this proposition, writing that to take “a measure of latitude” is to warp the Court’s 
duty to interpret the law.  Id. at 293 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens was joined in 
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The Court looked to the language of the statute and put great emphasis 
on the contractual structure of Title IX as compared to Title VII.50  
Whereas Title VII concentrates on making individuals whole after past 
discrimination, the Court recognized that Title IX aims to protect 
individuals from discriminatory practices carried out by federally 
funded educational programs.51  However, the Court reasoned that there 
must be a limit to liability because when a school accepts federal funds, it 
agrees to not discriminate on the basis of sex; however, the court also 
held that it is unlikely that a school agrees to be liable if one of its 
employees discriminates.52  The Gebser Court held that Congress did not 
intend to imply an enforcement scheme that would allow “greater 
liability without comparable conditions.”53   
In the absence of any further direction from Congress, the Court 
interpreted Title IX’s implied damages remedy as it did the express 
remedy, by holding that both are predicated upon notice to an 
appropriate person who has an opportunity to end the discrimination:   
                                                                                                             
his dissent by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Id.  These Justices found that the 
Court should not be involved in revising Congressional legislation.  Id.  The dissent 
continues to quote Cannon, “‘[We have no doubt that Congress intended to create Title IX 
remedies comparable to those available under Title VI and that it understood Title VI as 
authorizing an implied private cause of action for victims of the prohibited 
discrimination[.]’”  Id. at 293–94 (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694–98).  Because an implicit 
Congressional command has the same legal effect as an explicit one, and Title IX has been 
construed as having an implicit right to private cause of action, the Court should seek 
guidance from the text of the statute rather than from its own ideas of public policy.  Id. at 
296. 
50 Id. at 286.   
51 Id. at 287.  In addition, Title IX is a Spending Clause statute, and Congress would not 
have envisioned a federal funds recipient to be liable based on a concept as abstract as 
constructive notice or respondeat superior for an employee’s (teacher, coach, 
administrator) act of sexually harassing a student.  Id.    
52 Rosa H. v. San Elizario Ind. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 654 (5th Cir. 1997).  This reasoning 
highlights the different standards used to ascertain liability under Title VII.  See supra note 
45 (discussing different possible standards used to determine school liability).  
53 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.  However, Justice Ginsburg composed a dissent that focused 
on enforcement and highlighted the importance of a school’s sexual harassment prevention 
policy.  Id. at 306–07.  She drew from the tort doctrine of avoidable consequences in 
writing: 
I would recognize as an affirmative defense to a Title IX charge of 
sexual harassment, an effective policy for reporting and redressing 
such misconduct. School districts subject to Title IX's governance have 
been instructed by the Secretary of Education to install procedures for 
“‘prompt and equitable resolution’” of complaints, 34 CFR § 106.8(b) 
(1997), and the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights has 
detailed elements of an effective grievance process, with specific 
reference to sexual harassment, 62 Fed.Reg. 12034, 12044–12045 (1997). 
Id. 
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[W]e hold that a damages remedy will not lie under Title 
IX unless an official who at a minimum has authority to 
address the alleged discrimination and to institute 
corrective measures on the recipient's behalf has actual 
knowledge of discrimination in the recipient's programs 
and fails adequately to respond. 54 
In addition, this failure to respond must be an attitude of “deliberate 
indifference” to the discrimination at hand.55   
In Gebser, the teacher’s conduct was clearly intentional and it 
“occurred during, and as a part of, a curriculum activity in which he 
wielded authority over . . . [the student] that had been delegated to him 
by . . . [the school district].”56  While the majority did not deny that 
Gebser alleged an intentional violation as laid out in Franklin, the Court 
still held that the law did not provide a damages remedy for the Title IX 
violation alleged by Gebser because, while the guidance counselor was 
notified of the harassment, the appropriate officials did not have actual 
notice of Waldrop’s behavior.57  The dissent disagreed with the 
                                                 
54 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.  On the other hand, the Gebser dissent written by Justice 
Stevens references the earlier Franklin decision in comparing sexual harassment of a 
subordinate by a supervisor, to that of the harassment of a student by a teacher.  Id. at 297. 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  This reasoning has been used in numerous instances since Gebser.  
Justice Stevens argued in his dissent that Title IX places the duty on a school not to 
discriminate, and when a supervisor harasses a subordinate because of his or her sex, that 
is discrimination based on sex.  Id. (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty, Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 
(1992)).  The dissent emphasizes that the same rule should apply when a teacher sexually 
harasses or abuses a student.  Id.  The dissent continues, “Congress surely did not intend for 
federal moneys to be expended to support the intentional actions it sought by statute to proscribe.”  
Id. (quoting Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75).  Therefore, for the dissent, Franklin stands for the 
proposition that by accepting the federal funds, the school district assumes a duty to not 
discriminate on the basis of sex, and that sexual harassment of a student by a teacher 
violates that duty.  See id.   
55 Id. at 290 (majority opinion).  Comparable considerations led to the adoption of a 
deliberate indifference standard for claims under § 1983 against municipal entities.  See, 
e.g., Bd. of Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997);  Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 
378, 388–92 (1989); Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 123–24 (1992).  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (2000),  a civil rights statute providing a civil action for deprivation of rights.  But see 
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 304 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The only decisions the Court cites to 
support its adoption of such a stringent standard are cases arising under a quite different 
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).  
56 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 298.  The curriculum was partially funded with federal funds.  Id.; 
see also infra note 71 (discussing an instance in which a high school soccer coach abused the 
authority that the school had delegated to him).   
57 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 298.  The appropriate official would be one with “authority to 
institute corrective measure on the district’s behalf[.]”  Id.  See infra Part III.A.1 (examining 
who is the appropriate official in the context of athletics to receive notice that harassment is 
occurring).   
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majority’s reasoning and pointed out that Waldrop was empowered by 
the school and was able to continue his abuse of Gebser because of his 
school-sanctioned authority over the students.58  This initial 
establishment of the standard for institutional liability under Title IX was 
further elucidated in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education.59   
C. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education Clarifies the Standard 
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education did not deal with 
harassment by an employee of the school, but rather with student-on-
student harassment.60  The Supreme Court held that when a teacher or 
coach sexually harasses a student, that employee discriminates on the 
basis of sex in violation of Title IX.61  Justice O’Connor wrote for the 
majority and emphasized in her background that the hierarchical power 
structure at the school influenced the harassment liability.62  The Court 
held for the petitioner and clarified the standard put forth in Gebser.63   
                                                 
58 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 299.  The dissent emphasizes a conflict with agency law, under 
which the school is responsible for Waldrop's misconduct because of the existence of the 
agency relationship between Waldrop and the school that aided him in accomplishing the 
tort.  Id.  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1957) (discussing agency 
law).  Waldrop exercised a great amount of control because he was a secondary teacher.  
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 299.  Waldrop’s misuse of the authority given to him by the school 
allowed him to abuse the trust of his young student.  Id.  See generally infra Part III.C 
(discussing the intense power imbalance that exists in athletics).   
59 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).   
60 Id.  Petitioner filed suit on her daughter’s behalf, claiming that the continued sexual 
harassment had interfered with her daughter’s education and that the school officials’ 
deliberate indifference had created a hostile environment in violation of Title IX.  Id. at 636.  
In Monroe County Board of Education, the petitioner was a fifth grade girl who had been 
harassed by a classmate over an extended period of time.  Id. at 633.  On separate occasions, 
the student and the mother reported the harassment to the student’s teacher.  Id. at 634.  
The teacher allegedly assured the mother that this behavior had been reported to the school 
principal, but no disciplinary actions were taken, and the harasser was not separated from 
the victim, which allowed the harasser to continue harassing the female student over the 
course of several months.  Id.  At the time of these events, the Monroe County School Board 
had not established a policy on sexual harassment.  Id. at 635.  In fact, the school board had 
given no instruction to its personnel on how to respond to or report peer sexual 
harassment.  Id. 
61 Id. at 660.  This Note deals, in general, with hostile environment sexual harassment; 
another theory is quid pro quo harassment that occurs when some benefit or punishment 
depends upon the satisfaction of sexual demands.  See, e.g., Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 
20 (1st Cir. 1999) (quid pro quo sexual harassment claim).  See Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).  Both forms of sexual harassment are now accorded similar 
treatment under federal law.  See id.     
62 Davis, 526 U.S. at 646.  The Court described the power structure by stating, “In these 
circumstances, the recipient retains substantial control over the context in which the 
harassment occurs.  More importantly, however, in this setting the Board exercises 
significant control over the harasser.”  Id.  See infra Part III.B (exploring the ways power 
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The strict standard for sexual harassment liability is clear:  only 
when a recipient of federal funding had actual notice of and was 
deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment is that recipient liable for 
monetary damages.64  In addition, the harassment must be “so severe, 
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the 
victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by 
the school.”65  This is a difficult standard, especially given that additional 
limitations are imposed, for example, recipients of federal funds may be 
held liable under Title IX for their own actions.66   
The Davis Court recognized that the standard set by Gebser was an 
exacting one by commenting that it “sought to eliminate any ‘risk that 
the recipient would be liable in damages not for its own official decision 
but instead for its employees' independent actions.’”67  In addition, 
recipients can be held liable only when their deliberate indifference to 
harassment effectively caused the discrimination.68   
                                                                                                             
imbalances contribute to the development of an environment vulnerable to sexual 
harassment).    
63 Davis, 526 U.S. at 654.   
64 Cohen, supra note 1, at 336.  Cohen discusses this standard in reference to its 
application to sexual discrimination that is not necessarily harassment.  Id.  
65 Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.  A dissent, written by Justice Kennedy, expressed concern that 
this standard is not sufficient to distinguish student-student harassment cases from simple 
childish teasing (even based on gender) and actionable sexual harassment.  Id. at 676 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Justice Kennedy cautions that in student-student harassment 
cases this standard may “stigmatize children as sexual harassers[.]”  Id. at 674 (quoting 
Brief for Respondents 12–13).   
66 Id. at 640.  Here, petitioner was attempting to hold the school liable for its inaction 
because it was aware of and did nothing to punish the student perpetrator or to protect the 
victim.  Id.  See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (holding that a recipient 
of federal education funds may be held liable for teacher-student harassment if the 
recipient was deliberately indifferent to the sexual harassment).  See generally Pennhurst 
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (requiring that funding recipients 
have notice of their potential liability for monetary damages); Guardians Ass. v. Civil Serv. 
Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 597–98 (1983) (concluding that Pennhurst does not 
bar a Title VII private damages action when the federal funding recipient intentionally 
engages in conduct that violates Title VII).   
67 Davis, 526 U.S. at 643 (quoting Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91).  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U.S. 825 (1994).  Interestingly, a few years earlier, the Supreme Court considered what type 
of conduct constituted deliberate indifference in the prison context when an inmate 
brought suit based on a prison official’s violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.  Id.  The 
Court determined that a school district may escape liability if it can show “that [it] did not 
know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger and that [it was] 
therefore unaware of a danger, or that [it] knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit 
unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent.”  Id. 
at 843–44.   
68 Davis, 526 U.S. at 642 (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291).  See also City of Canton v. Harris, 
489 U.S. 378 (1989) (recognizing liability under § 1983 only if the municipality itself causes 
the violation).   
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1. Elements Needed to Prove Institutional Liability:  Deliberate 
Indifference 
A funding recipient’s deliberate indifference to sexual harassment 
must be a part of the theory of liability under Title IX when the federally 
funded institution has control over the harassment situation.69  For the 
recipient to have control over the situation, the harassment must take 
place in a context subject to the school district’s control.70  In addition, to 
be liable under Title IX the recipient must have the authority to take 
remedial action to address the harassment.71  The deliberate indifference 
standard means that, at a minimum, the school’s inaction must cause 
students to undergo sexual harassment or make them vulnerable to it.72   
The dissent in Davis cautioned that there must be a limitation to 
what type of third party conduct could be attributed to the school.73  It 
questioned the majority’s line of reasoning, which posited the idea that 
“one causes discrimination when one has some ‘degree of control’ over 
the discrimination and fails to remedy it.”74  This idea of causation could 
                                                 
69 Davis, 526 U.S. at 644.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 788 (8th ed. 2004).  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY defines deliberate indifference as “[t]he careful preservation of one's ignorance 
despite awareness of circumstances that would put a reasonable person on notice of a fact 
essential to a crime.”  Id. 
70 Davis, 526 U.S. at 645.  When the misconduct occurs during the school day and 
happens on school grounds, the harassment is taking place under the operation of the 
recipient of funding.  Id.  In Davis, the school had control not only over the general situation 
under which the harassment occurred but also over the harasser.  Id.   
71 Id. at 644.  See, e.g., Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Sch., 469 F.3d 479 (6th Cir. 
2006).  Although Title IX was enforceable through a private cause of action for sexual 
harassment, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the school or the 
administrators had actual notice or were deliberately indifferent to the coach’s sexual 
harassment of the girls’ high school soccer team as required for monetary remedies.  Id.  
The court held that even though a group of parents had complained to the assistant 
principal, who held a meeting with the coach, the athletic director, and the principal, the 
administration did not have actual notice.  Id. at 484–85.  In a case against the University of 
Georgia Board of Regents, a claim against the Board of Regents was dismissed because the 
plaintiff failed to allege that the president-elect had authority to take action to change the 
policies of the Board.  Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Geor., 477 F.3d 1282, 
1293–95 (11th Cir. 2007).   However, in a claim against the University of Georgia Athletic 
Association, the court held that the same president-elect, who was serving as president of 
the athletic association, was the appropriate person to receive notice.  Id. 
72 Davis, 526 U.S. at 645.  This is similar to the deliberate indifference standard the 
Supreme Court adopted in section 1983 claims that allege that the cause of the violation 
was the state’s failure to prevent the deprivation of rights.  Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.  See Bd. 
of Comm’rs of Bryan County. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 
388–92 (1989); see also Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 123–24 (1992) (examining a 
section 1983 claim).   
73 Davis, 526 U.S. at 662 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).   
74 Id. at 662.  The dissent continues to label the majority’s test an exercise in “arbitrary 
line-drawing.”  Id.   
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lead to unbalanced results when comparing liability between teacher-
student harassment and student-student harassment.75   
Many lower courts have looked to Davis to clarify what exactly the 
deliberate indifference standard means.76  In addition to the 
aforementioned elements, the federal funds recipient must make an 
official decision to not remedy the situation.77  The next prong of the 
standard implicates the power hierarchy in college athletics, as an 
appropriate official must receive “actual notice.”78 
                                                 
75 Id. at 679.  In his dissent in Davis, Justice Kennedy puts forward an intriguing 
hypothetical that demonstrates the disjuncture between student-student harassment and 
teacher-student harassment:   
In the context of teacher harassment, the Gebser notice standard 
imposes some limit on school liability.  Where peer harassment is the 
discrimination, however, it imposes no limitation at all. In most cases 
of student misbehavior, it is the teacher who has authority, at least in 
the first instance, to punish the student and take other measures to 
remedy the harassment.  The anomalous result will be that, while a 
school district cannot be held liable for a teacher's sexual harassment 
of a student without notice to the school board (or at least to the 
principal), the district can be held liable for a teacher's failure to 
remedy peer harassment.  The threshold for school liability, then, 
appears to be lower when the harasser is a student than when the 
harasser is a teacher who is an agent of the school.  The absurdity of 
this result confirms that it was neither contemplated by Congress nor 
anticipated by the States.   
Id. at 679–80.   
76 See, e.g., Hart v. Paint Valley Local Sch. Dist., 2002 WL 31951264 (S.D. Ohio 2002) 
(quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 648) (the Southern District of Ohio has noted that, per Davis, in 
order to satisfy the deliberate indifference standard, a plaintiff must show that the school 
district’s response was “clearly unreasonable” in light of the situation).   
77 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.  The Court explains that the standard of deliberate indifference 
has a rough parallel in an “administrative enforcement scheme [that] presupposes that an 
official who is advised of a Title IX violation refuses to take action to bring the recipient 
into compliance.”  Id.  The Court compares the deliberate indifference standard to a lower 
standard, where there would be the danger that a federal funds recipient could be held 
liable for not only its own official decisions and actions, but also for its employees’ 
independent actions. Id.   
78 Id. at 299.  In Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder, university officials were aware 
of several incidents of sexual assaults and sexual harassment by specific football players 
over four years.  500 F.3d. 1170 (10th Cir. 2007).  The District Court ruled that this did not 
constitute adequate notice that females faced a risk of harassment or assault by the football 
team at recruiting parties and granted summary judgment for the University of Colorado 
Boulder.  Id.  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment, 
but also held that the actual notice standard did not apply because it was a question of an 
official policy.  Id.  See also Rost v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 
177 (Jan. 4, 2008) (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 282) (on these facts, to impose liability on the 
school district would effectively hold it responsible for what it “should have known” about 
harassment but failed to uncover and eliminate).  See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.  That is not the 
duty Congress intended to impose by Title IX, which was enacted solely to respond to 
sexual harassment about which school officials have “actual knowledge[.]”  Id. 
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2. Elements Needed to Prove Institutional Liability:  Actual Notice 
A school district cannot be held liable for a teacher’s or coach’s 
sexual harassment of a student unless an official of the school, with a 
minimal level of authority to institute remedial measures, has “actual 
notice” of the misconduct.79  In his dissent to the decision in Davis, 
Justice Kennedy found it “telling” that the majority did not explicitly lay 
out which school officials qualify to receive this notice.80  Since the Court 
issued its decision in Gebser, courts have applied this standard 
differently.81  In fact, many courts have looked to pre-Gebser cases to 
determine who, within a school or school district, ought to qualify as the 
appropriate person to receive actual notice in order to trigger school 
liability.82   
The majority in Gebser reasoned that “Title IX contains important 
clues that Congress did not intend to allow recovery in damages where 
liability rests solely on principles of vicarious liability or constructive 
notice.”83  In addition, the majority found that it would actually 
                                                 
79 Davis, 526 U.S. at 647.  In addition, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 establishes that the federal 
government may not terminate funding until it has “advised the appropriate person or 
persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance 
cannot be secured by voluntary means.”  20 U.S.C. § 1682. 
80 Davis, 526 U.S. at 679 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  See also Rosa H. v. San Elizario Ind. 
Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997) (a pre-Gebser case that formulated a standard similar 
to Gebser in that it required actual notice to a school official who was invested by the school 
board with supervisory power over the offending employee).   
81 Thomas Keefe, Annotation, Right of Action Under Title IX of Education Amendments Act 
of 1972 (20 U.S.C.A. § 1681) Against School or School District for Sexual Harassment of Student 
by Student's Teacher or Other School District Employee, 197 A.L.R. Fed. 289 § 2(b) (2004).  
Compare Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F.Supp. 867, 876 (M.D.Ga.1993) (“This court finds no basis 
for plaintiffs’ Title IX claim.  Assuming that [the school security guard’s] assaults on 
plaintiffs constitute discrimination based upon sex, the Board had no part in this 
discrimination.”), with Rosa H., 106 F.3d at 659 (positing the idea that liability might arise 
whenever any school employee is aware of the harassment).   
82 Keefe, supra note 81, at § 2(b).  Rosa H. finds a middle ground, balancing the 
meaningful tort liability envisioned by the earlier decisions with the accepted 
interpretation that Title IX only provides for liability for an intentional act.  106 F.3d at 659–
60.  That court held that a school district may be held liable for teacher-student Title IX 
harassment “only if a school official who had actual knowledge of the abuse was invested 
by the school board with the duty to supervise the employee and the power to take action 
that would end such abuse and failed to do so.”  Id. at 660.  This standard would exclude 
from liability other teachers, coaches, and janitors unless they have been specifically 
assigned a supervisory role with the power to halt abuse.  Id.  This standard mirrors the 
Title VII standard for when an employer’s knowledge of workplace harassment subjects an 
employer to liability.  Id.   
83 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288.  The Court looked to Title VII legislation, which provided for 
an express right of action but did not include recovery for monetary damages; instead the 
legislation limited recovery to injunctive and equitable relief.  Id. at 289.  See also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000a-3(a) (1970 ed.); § 2000e-(b), 5(e), (g) (1970 ed., Supp. II).  Even though Congress did 
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“frustrate the purposes” of Title IX to allow recovery for damages under 
a theory of respondeat superior or constructive notice; thus, actual notice 
to an official is required.84  Therefore, the Court restricted the 
opportunities for recovery and hindered the ultimate goal of Title IX 
under the guise of protecting the purpose of Title IX.85   
Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder was a recent occurrence in 
which a court restricted the idea of notice; in Simpson, several women 
alleged that University of Colorado officials were aware of the football 
program creating an atmosphere during parties for recruits that involved 
harassing women.86  The circuit court found the Gebser notice standard 
did not apply to the University of Colorado because the issue was not 
whether notice was received by the institution; rather, it was whether the 
claim involved official policy that encouraged the harassment.87  
However, the Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit repeated the 
underlying principle that liability should be restricted to only intentional 
actions made by the institution.88  Here, the court narrowly construed the 
issue and determined that actual notice does not include the existence of 
                                                                                                             
provide for damages when it amended Title VII in 1991, it limited recovery according to the 
size of the employer.  Id. at §2000e- (b); see also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285–86; Rosa H., 106 F.3d 
at 660.  The agency theory and Title VII’s constructive-notice theory were also rejected 
because both violated the established principle that penalties for a failure to comply with 
conditions on the disbursement of Spending Clause funds are contractual in nature. Rosa 
H., 106 F.3d at 660;  see Davis, 526 U.S. at 640 (“[P]rivate damages actions are available only 
where recipients of federal funding had adequate notice that they could be liable for the 
conduct at issue[.]”); Pennhurst, 451 U.S at 17 (“There can. . . be no knowing acceptance [of 
the terms of the contract] if a State is unaware of the conditions [imposed by the legislation 
on its receipt of funds].”).   
84 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285.  Title IX is fundamentally different than Title VII because while 
Title VII is intended to “compensate victims of discrimination, Title IX focuses more on 
‘protecting’ individuals from discriminatory practices carried out by recipients of federal 
funds.”  Id. at 287.   
85 See also Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
117 S. Ct. 165 (1996) (a decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals holding that a school 
is not liable under Title IX even if it is on notice of peer-to-peer sexual harassment and 
ignores it or fails to remedy it, unless it responds differently based on the sex of the alleged 
victim).   
86 Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder, 500 F.3d. 1170, 1173 (10th Cir. 2007).  See 
supra note 78 (discussing in further detail the facts of Simpson). 
87 Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1178 (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290).  Cf. Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist. 
Perry Twp., 128 F.3d 1014, 1022–27 (noting that the notice standard for schools in Title IX 
sexual harassment claim is higher than the notice standard for employers under Title VII). 
88 Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1178.  This was a disappointment to Title IX activists, as some felt 
that “‘if the overall environment at a school can serve as actual notice (of sexual 
harassment), that would be new.’”  Erik Brady, Colorado Scandal Could Hit Home to Other 
Colleges, USA TODAY, May 5, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/ 
football/big12/2004-05-26-colorado-cover_x.htm. 
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an official policy.89  Specifically, even if the appropriate official has actual 
notice and is not deliberately indifferent, the harassment in question 
must also rise to a particular level before a Title IX claim will be allowed. 
3. Harassment That Is Severe, Pervasive, and Objectively Offensive—
Jennings Demonstrates the Standard in Athletics90 
Whether gender-oriented sexual harassment amounts to actionable 
(severe or pervasive) Title IX discrimination “depends on a constellation 
of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships.”91  Courts 
examine all circumstances, including the positions of the harasser and 
the victim, the ages of both, whether the harassment was severe, 
frequent, physically intimidating, or humiliating, and whether it 
deprived the student of educational or athletic opportunities.92  Courts 
                                                 
89 Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1178.  Interestingly, a pre-Gebser case was prophetic in predicting 
the position the courts would take on what constitutes proper notice.  See Rosa H. v. San 
Elizario Ind. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997)  There, the Fifth Circuit Court held that 
the fifteen-year-old student whose karate instructor had repeatedly initiated sexual 
intercourse with him was sexually harassed, but that a school district is only liable if a 
school official, who had actual knowledge of abuse, was vested by the school board with 
the duty to supervise the instructor and the power to take action that would end such 
abuse and failed to do so.  Id.  
90 See Davis Next Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 
(1999).  Just as Jennings presents the standard for severe harassment in athletics, the Court 
in Davis envisions an example of this standard in the classroom.  See id.  A clear example of 
student-student harassment that would trigger a damages claim under this standard 
would be one involving the overt, physical deprivation of access to school resources.  Id.  
An example used by the Davis court involves boys in a class making fun of and threatening 
girls everyday, thereby preventing the girls from using a certain computer lab.  Id. at 651.  
If the district administrators are aware of the boys’ conduct, yet do nothing, their inaction 
would be considered pervasive enough to establish an actionable claim.  Id.  However, 
actual physical exclusion from an educational resource is not necessary; instead, actionable 
harassment can be any harassment that is so severe that it detracts from the victims’ 
education so that they are denied equal access to institutional resources.  Id.  The broad 
purpose of Title IX is to equalize opportunities for both sexes in education and educational 
extracurricular activities.  See supra Part II.A (discussing the legislative intent behind Title 
IX). 
91 Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 696 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 
651).  Jennings emphasizes the importance of power imbalance in making a determination 
about whether a claim is actionable.  Id.  See also supra Part III.B (investigating the power 
imbalance). 
92 Jennings, 482 F.3d at 696.  See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993).  Harris 
is a Title VII case in which the Court held that while the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited 
conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable person’s psychological well-being, the 
statute was not limited to such conduct.  Id.  The Court held that as long as the 
environment could reasonably be perceived as hostile or abusive, it did not have to inflict 
psychological injury.  Id. at 23.  In addition, whether an environment is hostile or abusive 
can be determined only by looking at all the existing circumstances.  Id.  This can include, 
but is not limited to “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 
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also consider whether the harassment creates an “‘environment that a 
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive’” and that the victim 
herself feels is abusive.93  However, a hostile environment may exist even 
without obvious tangible injury to the student.94  For example, while the 
Supreme Court has not decided the issue, the OCR has held that a 
student may be able to remain on a sports team, despite feeling 
humiliated or angered by harassment.95  Regardless of the OCR’s 
holding, harassing conduct of this type alters the student's educational 
environment on the basis of sex and therefore violates Title IX.96  An 
athletic environment is highly susceptible to becoming hostile because of 
the physical and emotional closeness it involves.97 
In fact, “there is ‘little doubt that the enactment was aimed, in part, 
at creating a more level playing field for female athletes;]’” therefore it is 
also necessary to examine player-coach relationships within this 
                                                                                                             
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it 
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.”  Id. 
93 Jennings, 482 F.3d at 696 (quoting Davis, 510 U.S. at 21).  Courts should use common 
sense and an appropriate sensitivity to the social context to differentiate between behavior 
as either sexual harassment or just “‘[s]imple teasing, offhand comments, [or] isolated 
incidents[.]’”  Id.  (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)). 
94 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (holding that tangible harm is not required for the 
harassment to rise to the level of severity sufficient to induce institutional liability). 
95  Sexual Harassment Guidance:  Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other 
Students, or Third Parties, n.51 (1997), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ 
ocr/docs/sexhar01.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2008) (citing to Summerfield Schools, OCR 
Case No. 15-92-1029). 
96 Notice of Publication of Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034, 12041 (1997).  Behavior that, 
outside of the athletic environment, might be objectionable may not rise to the level of 
sexual harassment on a sports team.  See Jennings, 482 F.3d at 698 (“A male coach might use 
sexual slang in front of his women players, and the players might do the same in front of 
the coach. Title IX is not a civility code for the male coach who coaches women, and it is not 
meant to punish such a coach for off-color language that is not aimed to degrade or 
intimidate.”). 
97 See infra Part III.B (examining the power imbalance).  Davis, 526 U.S at 678 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting).  Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Davis criticized the utility of this prong of the 
standard.  Id.  Justice Kennedy pointed out that the Court's reliance on the impact on the 
victim’s education suggests that the objective offensiveness of a comment is to be judged by 
reference to a reasonable child or other young person, a standard that is likely to be quite 
expansive.  Id.  This standard also gives juries no real guidance, but instead requires them 
to attempt to gauge the sensitivities of an average child.  Id.  See Wiener, supra note 46.  In 
addition, the psychological community found the standard to be appalling; one 
commentator noted “[a]pparently, the Court assumed that young girls and boys are mature 
and thoughtful enough to expose sexual misconduct to high-ranking school authorities.”  
Id.  See Jennings, 482 F.3d at 716 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).  On the other hand, many courts 
have held that this standard is not intended to be a “general civility code.”  Id.; see also 
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. 
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context.98  Jennings v. University of North Carolina illustrates how a coach 
created an environment that was hostile to his female athletes.99  The 
coach allegedly made sexually charged comments to the team, 
questioned team members about their sex lives in graphic detail, and 
made explicit sexual references to several players’ anatomical features.100  
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, en banc, held that the plaintiff had 
proffered facts that were sufficient for a jury to find that the coach’s 
sexually harassing conduct was degrading and pervasive enough to 
create a hostile environment and therefore denied the school’s motion 
for summary judgment.101  Thus, the case was a victory in the Fourth 
Circuit for Title IX advocates, but the Supreme Court denied certiorari; 
therefore, the Court missed an opportunity to establish national 
precedent for institutional liability under Title IX.102  In sum, the Court 
failed to contemplate that its Title IX holdings would “render inutile 
                                                 
98 Karen Fadulto, Can the Concept of “Good Coaching” Be Quantified for the Purposes of Title 
IX Sex Discrimination Claims? 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS & CONTEMP. PROBS. 220, 225 (2006) 
(quoting Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993).  Fadulto indicates that 
Congress’s use of the language “any education program or activity” in Title IX has been 
interpreted as showing Congress’s intent to use Title IX to improve equality in athletics.  Id. 
at 224 (citing Haffer v. Temple Univ. of Commonwealth System of Higher Educ., 678 
F.Supp. 517, 541 (D. Pa. 1988)). 
99 Jennings, 482 F.3d at 686.  See also infra Part III.B (discussing the ubiquitous power 
imbalance that exists in college athletics on both male and female teams). 
100 Jennings, 482 F.3d at 697.  Specifically, one player testified that her coach’s comments 
made her “fe[el] dirty’” and “‘made [her] skin crawl’” and another stated that she felt 
pressured because of his excessive intrusion into all of the players’ sex lives.  Id.  The 
coach’s comments allegedly carried overtones of vulgarity and promiscuity.  Id. at 692–94. 
101 Id. at 698–99.  Judge Niemeyer issued a scathing dissent in the Jennings case, stating 
that the majority had actually interpreted Davis incorrectly.  Jennings, 482 F.3d at 718–19 
(Neimeyer, J., dissenting).  Judge Niemeyer claimed the majority ignored the requirement 
of Title IX liability that the conduct in question “deprive a plaintiff of ‘equal access to an 
institution's resources and opportunities.’”  Id. at 718 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 651).  
Contrary to the majority’s reading of Davis, the dissent contended that the Supreme Court 
has held many times that Title IX's discrimination requirement is satisfied “only where [the 
harassment is so severe or pervasive] that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the 
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”  Jennings, 482 F.3d at 718 
(emphasis in original) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 654).  Niemeyer continued to blast the 
majority in its interpretation of the standard.  Id.  Instead of utilizing the correct standard, 
Niemeyer claims the majority used a watered down “negative impact” test and therefore 
found that the coach’s conduct may have caused a negative impact of some sort.  Id. at 719 
(showing the difficulty and variety of ways the standard has been interpreted by different 
courts). 
102 See also Simpson, 500 F.3d. 1170.  Several women alleged that Colorado University was 
aware that the football team’s recruiting program created an atmosphere that involved 
harassing women during parties for its recruits, but the court found this was insufficient 
notice.  Id. at 1173. 
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causes of action authorized by Congress [by deciding] that no remedy is 
available.”103 
III.  ANALYSIS OF THE INHERENT POWER IMBALANCES AND THE EASILY 
TWISTED STANDARD, WHICH ENCOURAGE THE FORMULATION OF MERELY 
REACTIVE INSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS 
Since 1972, numerous decisions by federal court judges have twisted 
Title IX so that it no longer serves the purpose that Senator Bayh 
envisioned.104  Unfortunately, it seems that the Gebser dissent was 
prophetic when it foretold that few Title IX plaintiffs who were victims 
of intentional discrimination or harassment would be able to recover 
damages under the exceedingly high standard established by the 
majority decision.105   The Gebser standard has been distorted to allow 
                                                 
103 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74 (emphasis in original).  See Gebser, 524  U.S. at 306 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent in Gebser that focused on an affirmative 
defense for schools.  Id.  Justices Souter and Breyer joined Ginsburg in this dissent, in which 
Ginsburg noted that she would accept an effective policy for reporting and redressing Title 
IX sexual harassment as a defense.  Id. at 307.  The dissent pointed out that school districts 
that receive federal funding have already been instructed to prepare procedures for prompt 
and equitable resolution of complaints.  See id.; 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (1997).  The Department 
of Education has also issued regulations on the dissemination of such procedures.  See 34 
C.F.R. § 106.9 (1997).  See also Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 95 at n.56.  The 
Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Education issued a policy stating that a school 
district is liable under Title IX if one of its teachers “was aided in carrying out the sexual 
harassment of students by his or her position of authority with the institution.”  Id.  See 34 
C.F.R. § 106.8 (2007).  The Department of Education has also promulgated the elements of 
what an effective grievance process looks like, with specific reference to sexual harassment.  
Id.  In her dissent in Gebser, Justice Ginsburg wrote that, under such a scheme, the burden 
would be on the school district to show that these types of procedures were easily available 
and would have redressed the injury at hand.  Gebser, 524 U.S. at 307 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting).  Following that, if the student failed to utilize these remedial and preventative 
measures, she would not qualify for Title IX relief.  Id.  See infra Part III.C (discussing 
various protocol and the shortcomings of relying on reactive procedures). 
104 See supra Part II.B (discussing Canton, Franklin, Gebser, and Davis); supra note 17 
(discussing Bayh’s vision). 
105 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 304.  Several alternative remedies are available outside of Title IX, 
but these approaches have led to varied results.  See generally Knackert v. Estes, 926 F. 
Supp. 979 (D. Nev. 1996) (applying Nevada law) (a Nevada District Court held that the 
school district was liable for a teacher’s sexual harassment of a student under the doctrine 
of respondeat superior);  Ada D. v. City of New York, 190 A.D.2d 356 (1st Dep't 1993), order 
aff'd, 638 N.E.2d 962, (1994) (a school may be negligent in hiring or supervising an 
employee with a propensity to engage in sexual misconduct); P.L. v. Aubert, 545 N.W.2d 
666 (Minn. 1996) (the Minnesota Supreme Court ordered dismissal of a student’s negligent 
supervision action against a school, for injuries sustained during a sexual relationship with 
a teacher because the court determined that the district’s supervision of the teacher had 
been adequate, and that closer attention would not have prevented or revealed the 
relationship); Godar v. Edwards, 588 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa 1999) (the Iowa Supreme Court 
affirmed a directed verdict for the school district in an action brought by a student to 
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insufficient procedural safeguards and excessive power imbalances to 
effectively prevent instances of sexual harassment in college athletics 
from being investigated and prosecuted, especially when committed in a 
team setting.106 
As athletics become more competitive at all levels, coaches gain 
power and prestige that could be used to harm players.107  In addition to 
the difficulty in creating adequate procedural safeguards to address 
sexual harassment, the power structure of a team creates an environment 
conducive to harassment, consequently forming additional obstacles to 
utilizing procedural measures.108 
Schools and athletic programs have attempted to address sexual 
harassment by enacting various procedural measures, although the 
success of the measures is questionable.109  These procedures tend to be 
reactive, utilized only after harassment has occurred and the damage has 
been done to the athlete.110  Institutions need to take interest in 
                                                                                                             
recover damages for years of sexual harassment by school curriculum director under 
vicarious liability standard because the director’s sexual abuse was not of the same basic 
nature as his duties as curriculum director); States Get Tough on Classroom Sexual 
Misconduct, CNN, Jan. 28, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/US/01/27/teacher.sex. 
abuse.ap/index.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2008) (new Missouri legislation would eliminate 
statute of limitations for sexual misconduct). 
106 See supra Part II.C.3 (noting that Jennings is a well known case in which both the trial 
and appellate courts found that the coach’s actions did not rise to the level of sexual 
harassment and that it was only after the appellate court re-heard the case en banc that the 
judges found in favor of Jennings). 
107 See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the Jennings case).  See also Jennings, 444 F.3d at 283.  
Coach Dorrance was the most successful women’s soccer coach in history, having won 18 
of the 23 championships held before 2004.  Id.  He also coached the women’s U.S. National 
Team, and many girls stated they would “cut off their right arm” to play for him.  Jennings, 
482 F3d. at 696. 
108 See supra Part II.C.3 (using Jennings as an example of an instance when a coach used 
his position and power to create an environment in which he could manipulate and harass 
female players). 
109 See infra Part III.C.A.  See Robin Finn, Out of Bounds – A Special Report:  Growth in 
Women’s Sports Stirs Harassment Issue, N.Y. TIMES 11, March 7, 1999.  The New York Times 
report discussed the circumstances surrounding an increase in harassment: 
[T]he rise in reports of harassment by male coaches is acknowledged to 
be an unanticipated byproduct of a landmark victory for women: Title 
IX, the 1972 law barring sexual discrimination at schools that receive 
Federal money.  As participation in organized women's athletics has 
rocketed from 300,000 to 3 million student-athletes in the wake of Title 
IX, creating a need for thousands of new coaches, the share of those 
coaches who are women has dropped dramatically:  at the college 
level, the percentage of female head coaches of women's teams has 
fallen to 47.4 percent, from 90 percent in 1972. 
Id. 
110 See supra note 103 (discussing the OCR’s Guidance, which suggests specific grievance 
procedures but only briefly reviews proactive preventative measures). 
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preventing harm to their students by instituting measures to prevent 
sexual harassment that go beyond merely avoiding legal liability.111 
Part III.A analyzes how the Gebser standard has been exploited so as 
to allow weak policies to interact with the existing power imbalances, 
leading to an environment especially vulnerable to sexual harassment.112  
Part III.B considers what impact the inherent power imbalance plays in 
creating an environment vulnerable to harassment, as well as impeding 
the prevention and reporting of sexual harassment in these 
environments.113  Finally, Part III.C uses the interplay between the 
twisted standard and inherent power imbalances to show why 
institutions tend to concentrate on reactive measures at the expense of 
preventative procedures, and focuses on the shortcomings typically 
present in these reactive policies that betray the intent of Title IX.114 
A. The Gebser Standard Leads to Poorly Formulated Policy and Exacerbates 
Existing Power Imbalances 
Under the Gebser standard, only when a federal funding recipient 
has actual notice of, and was deliberately indifferent to, sexual 
harassment can the recipient be held liable for monetary damages.115  
The Supreme Court’s decisions have made it difficult for college athletes 
to succeed because the actual notice and deliberate indifference prongs 
provide an institution with loopholes that allow it to avoid liability.116  
                                                 
111 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 677.  The passive language of the statute demonstrates the 
focus on the well-being of the benefited class.  Id.  (“No person in the United States shall, on 
the basis of sex, be excluded . . .”  20 U.S.C. § 1681). 
112 Infra Part III.A (discussing the language of the Gebser standard and the way it can, and 
has, been twisted to reduce schools’ liability under Title IX, concentrating on who the 
“appropriate person” is to receive notice and the ways a school can avoid liability if its 
actions merely surpass an attitude of “deliberate indifference” to sexual harassment); see 
also States Get Tough on Classroom Sexual Misconduct, CNN, Jan. 28, 2008, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/US/01/27/teacher.sex.abuse.ap/index.html (last visited Jan 
28, 2008) (“When abuse happens, administrators too often fail to let others know about it, 
and too many legal loopholes let offenders stay in the classroom.”). 
113 Infra Part III.B (examining the power hierarchy inherent in college athletics, and the 
manner in which it restricts an athlete’s opportunities to report sexual harassment while, at 
the same time, increasing the risk that a sexually hostile environment will develop). 
114 Infra Part III.C (exploring the suggested OCR policies and the reactive policies 
generally enacted by schools and athletic programs that, when combined with power 
imbalances inherent in college athletics, results in reduced school responsibility and 
difficulty in preventing sexual harassment). 
115 See supra Part II.C.  See Davis, 526 U.S. at 651.  The harassment must also be so severe 
and pervasive that it creates a hostile environment.  Id.  The power imbalance discussed 
earlier is one component of creating a hostile environment and is one of the “constellation” 
of factors considered by the courts.  Id.  See also Part III.B (analyzing the power imbalance). 
116 See supra Parts II.B.3-C.2 (offering an examination and criticism of the idea of actual 
notice). 
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Ideally, an institution has received notice when it “knew or, in the 
exercise of reasonable care, should have known” about the ongoing 
harassment.117  Difficulty in determining liability results because it is 
often unclear who the appropriate official to receive notice is, and it is 
also unclear what the notice must consist of in the athletic 
environment.118  There is no set standard specifically for athletics,119 but 
analogies can be drawn between examples given by the OCR Guidance 
for schools and the corresponding situations in athletics.120 
                                                 
117 See Revised Guidance supra, note 20, at V.B1; see also Notice of Publication of 
Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 11450 (discussing different ways a school can receive notice).  See 
infra note 120.  This is an optimistic view of notice, as the Department of Education is a 
government body committed to pursuing and treating sexual harassment aggressively.  See 
infra note 120. 
118 Kristen M. Galles, Filling the Gaps:  Women, Civil Rights and Title IX, AM. BAR ASS’N 
SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITIES, HUMAN RIGHTS (Summer 2004), 
http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/summer04/gaps.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).  
Ironically, the court in Gebser actually refused to adopt a more lenient standard such as the 
one used in employee-employer harassment cases in Title VII, where the employer can be 
held liable if it should have known of the harassment.  Id. 
119 Viv Bernstein, Sex Harassment Faces Title IX Test, WOMEN’S ENEWS, Sept. 23, 2007.  
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm?aid=3323 (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).  See cf. 
Jennings, 482 F.3d at 725 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).  Interestingly, the dissent here seems to 
suggest that the environment of college athletics is naturally more demanding and more 
hostile, and therefore the same standard should not be applied to athletics as is applied in 
the classroom or courtroom.  Id.  at 725.  The dissent concluded that 
In the context of this case, Title IX presents the narrow issue of 
whether a player—in this case Jennings—was denied the benefits of 
the soccer team because of Coach Dorrance's comments.  It is crystal 
clear that she did not think so until after she was cut from the team. 
From her anger and disappointment in being cut—concededly not 
because of sexual discrimination—she pursues this unfortunate 
lawsuit to complain about vulgar language that surely did offend her, 
and rightfully so.  But Title IX requires more. 
Id. 
120 See Revised Guidance supra note 20, at V.C: 
 A student, parent, or other individual may have contacted other 
appropriate personnel, such as a principal, campus security, bus 
driver, teacher, affirmative action officer, or staff in the office of 
student affairs. A teacher or other responsible employee of the school 
may have witnessed the harassment.  The school may receive notice 
about harassment in an indirect manner, from sources such as a 
member of the school staff, a member of the educational or local 
community, or the media. 
Id.  Dear Colleague letter from Kenneth L. Marcus, Office for Civil Rights, TITLE IX 
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, (Apr. 26, 2004), 
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/responsibilities_ix.html.  This is a bit of an 
optimistic list because it comes from the Department of Education, who is “committed to 
enforcing Title IX aggressively.”  Id. 
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In the groundbreaking Gebser case, the school principal knew of the 
ongoing sexual harassment, but was not considered the appropriate 
school official to trigger school liability.121  He or she apparently did not 
have the authority to institute “corrective measures” on the district’s 
behalf.122  This is comparable to claiming that the athletic director of a 
school did not have the authority to institute changes in the athletic 
department.123  While the “notice” standard in athletics has not been 
considered by the Supreme Court, there is a slight trend, at least at the 
appellate level, to find that if the abuse was reported to a member of the 
school staff, an appropriate person did have notice.124  However, many 
lower courts have still been reluctant to hold institutions liable, refusing 
to be what some call “polite police” for coaches, or fearing that Title IX is 
becoming a “general civility code.”125 
Sexual harassment in the classroom has been litigated much more 
than harassment on the playing field, so it is beneficial to examine who 
was considered the appropriate official by the courts in those cases.126  
Lower courts have held that giving notice to a guidance counselor,127 a 
school principal,128 or a director of a university department129 does not 
always trigger institutional liability because these are not the appropriate 
                                                 
121 See supra Part II.C (articulating the “actual notice” test). 
122 See supra Part II.B.  Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.  “[A] damages remedy will not lie under 
Title IX unless an official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged 
discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the [funding] recipient's behalf has 
actual knowledge of discrimination” and is deliberately indifferent to it.  Id.  See also 
Jennings, 444 F.3d 255.  In Jennings, both the trial and appellate courts found that, although 
the student athlete reported her harassment to the university’s counsel and an official 
responsible for fielding sexual harassment claims, the school did not have notice.  Id.  It was 
only after a rehearing en banc that the court held that this did, in fact, constitute notice.  Id.  
The en banc hearing resulted in three circuit court judges finding for the athlete and two 
judges dissenting in favor of the defendant.  Id. 
123 See also infra Part III.B.  At larger universities, one must wonder what the chances are 
for a freshman on the volleyball team, or a red-shirted member of the wrestling team, to 
meet privately with the athletic director to report sexual harassment.  See infra Part III.B 
(further exploring the difficulty in reporting that exists because of power imbalances 
issues). 
124 See, e.g., Jennings, 482 F.3d 686 (abuse reported to a member of the administration).  
But see Simpson, 500 F.3d 1170 (overall environment does not constitute notice). 
125 Bernstein, supra note 119 (quoting Nancy Hogshead-Makar, professor at Florida 
Coastal Law School and a Title IX expert).  See also Jennings, 482 F.3d at 716; supra Part II.C.3 
(examining the level of abuse necessary to rise to the level required for a claim under Title 
IX). 
126 See supra Part II (discussing several ground-breaking Title IX cases). 
127 Good v. Reading Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2002). 
128 Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2001). 
129 Liu v. Striuli, 36 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.R.I. 1999).  See also Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786 
(11th Cir. 1998) (it was not sufficient that the supervisor of a school security guard knew of 
the assault). 
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officials.130  Specifically, the language of Gebser requires that an official 
with power to “institute corrective measures” must have notice.131  This 
requirement allows institutions to jump through a loophole because the 
official with this power is most likely so high up the hierarchy that 
athletes have no real access to him.132  The class of persons that actually 
has the authority to “institute corrective measures” is likely a very small 
group; only few people can institute measures against a popular, 
successful coach.133  A further problem is that if student-athletes do have 
access to this official, the athlete may not feel comfortable going to the 
individual because there is no pre-existing relationship with that person 
or the official is a friend of the harassing coach.134  Therefore, the 
requirement of notice to a particular person hinders reporting, and has 
remained a loophole available for institutions to avoid liability.135 
An additional element in the Gebser standard is that after the 
appropriate official receives actual notice, the institution must be 
“deliberately indifferent” to the sexual harassment.136  Deliberate 
indifference “is an official decision by the recipient not to remedy the 
                                                 
130 See also Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 398–400 (5th Cir. 1996).  
Canutillo held, contrary to the Department of Education’s policy, that a school district was 
not liable when a teacher sexually molested a second grade student because the student 
and her mother reported the harassment only to the student’s homeroom teacher.  Id.  Even 
though the school handbook instructed students and parents to report sexual harassment 
grievances to a child’s homeroom teacher, the court held that notice must be given to 
“someone with authority to take remedial action[.]”  Id. at 402.  But see Morse v. Regents of 
the Univ. of Colorado, 154 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 1998) (the Tenth Circuit Court found that the 
institution could be sued because the university affirmative action officer and a dean had 
notice of the harassment). 
131 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277. 
132 Id. at 284.  See infra Part III.B for a discussion of how the power structure prevents 
athletes from feeling comfortable reporting their coaches or other officials. 
133 See Jennings, 444 F.3d at 283.  Coach Dorrance was the most successful women’s soccer 
coach in history.  Id.  See also Part IV.B (emphasizing the need to have appropriate officials 
available outside the athletic office as well). 
134 See supra Part IV.B (proposing new regulations that would provide athletes with more 
outlets to report sexual harassment and would encourage a community standard). 
135 See infra Part IV.B (suggesting a legal standard more in line with the Department of 
Education’s standard for agency enforcement). 
136 See supra Part II.  The deliberate indifference standard becomes chillingly high when 
coupled with the requirement that the harassment must rise to a level that limits or denies 
“a student's ability to participate in or benefit from a school program[.]”  Revised Guidance 
supra note 20, at V.B.1.  The opportunity to be a part of an athletic team is clearly an 
educational benefit that would be denied if a student-athlete lost a scholarship, had their 
playing time reduced, or was cut from the team because of reporting a coach or other 
school official for sexual harassment.  Clare Williams, Sexual Orientation Harassment and 
Discrimination: Legal Protection for Student Athletes, 17 J. OF LEG. ASPECTS OF SPORT 253, 275 
(Summer 2007). 
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violation[]” or a refusal to take action to comply with Title IX.137  At a 
minimum, if an institution takes “timely and reasonable measures to end 
the harassment, it is not liable under Title IX.”138  For a school to reach 
the level of deliberate indifference that will result in liability, it must 
either completely ignore the harassment or take actions that could not be 
expected to remedy the violation.139 
This standard leads to problems because it allows—even 
encourages—simply addressing the harassment after it has already 
occurred; there is no real requirement for the institution to prevent 
harassment.140  Some federal judges have even suggested that because 
sports are naturally competitive, the standard should be higher.141  If a 
college athletic department fails to prevent the sexual harassment of a 
student, the school is not liable under Title IX unless it had a systematic 
institutional policy of being indifferent.142  On the other hand, if, after the 
proper person receives actual notice, the athletic department or the 
school as a whole refuses to address the known sexual harassment 
violations, the school can be held liable under Title IX.143  Therefore, 
institutions avoid legal liability by implementing sufficient measures so 
that they cannot be seen as being “deliberately indifferent” to the 
                                                 
137 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. See supra, Part II.C.1 (explaining that deliberate indifference 
occurs when the institution takes steps that are “clearly unreasonable[]”). 
138 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91.  See also Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 
1022, 1034 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that a school district must be deliberately indifferent 
to its students’ right to an education free of hostility and discrimination). 
139 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91. 
140 See infra Part III.C.  See also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288.  The court provided a legal standard 
for recovery of damages, but did not even address equitable relief such as an injunction 
against schools who refuse or are negligent in adopting preventative measures.  Id.  See 
Wiener, supra note 46: 
 The theories of liability that the Supreme Court applies in Titles 
VII and IX appear indifferent to the common experience of workers 
and students.  That is, the courts assume a great deal about the effects 
of different reporting standards without knowledge of the impact of 
those standards on the behavior of workers, teachers and students.   
 Psychologists can assist the courts in clarifying the distinction 
between Title VII and IX liability by investigating the impact of victim 
reporting requirements on the perceptions of safety, control and 
comfort in students and workers. 
Id. 
141 See Jennings, 482 F.3d at 719.  Judge Niemeyer took issue with the majority’s position 
in his dissent to Jennings, calling the test it used a watered down “negative impact” test.  Id. 
142 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 339 (2007). 
143 Id.  See infra Part III.C (discussing OCR-recommended and already existing policies). 
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harassment, which becomes problematic when sexual harassment 
continues to occur in the powerful hierarchy of college athletics.144 
B. The Power Imbalances Inherent in Athletics 
The above-mentioned harassment nearly always takes place in either 
a school or an athletic setting where power imbalances are rampant.145  
Federal funding recipients retain control over the environment in which 
the harassment occurs, and more importantly, in many settings, the 
school board will exercise significant control over the actual harasser.146  
Sexual harassment tends to be more rampant “in institutions 
characterized by hierarchical distributions of power”—structures that 
are common in intercollegiate sports environments.147 
There are a multitude of definitions of sexual harassment and many 
of them include an element of power imbalance.148  Coaches and teachers 
                                                 
144 See infra Part III.B.  The resulting problem of institutions relying on reactive measures, 
rather than focusing on preventing the harm from ever being inflicted, will be addressed in 
depth in Part III.C.  See generally infra Part III.C. 
145 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995).  It is relevant to examine 
power structure because the Supreme Court has observed “that the nature of [the State's] 
power [over public schoolchildren] is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of 
supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults.”  Id.  See also Davis, 526 
U.S. at 674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Independent Women's Forum as 
Amicus Curiae 19) (“questioning whether ‘at the primary and secondary school level’ it is 
proper to label ’sexual misconduct by students’ as ‘sexual harassment’ because there is no 
power relationship between the harasser and the victim”).  See also Finn, supra note 109, at 
11.  Researchers commented that “[t]here's no such thing as consensual anything when one 
person has that much control over another.”  Id. 
146 Davis, 526 U.S. at 646.  See also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 507 (1969) (demonstrating that the Supreme Court recognizes the importance of school 
officials’ “comprehensive authority” consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards 
to prescribe and control conduct in the schools). 
147 Karin A.E. Volkwein, Frauke I. Schnell, Dennis Sherwood & Anne Livezey, Sexual 
Harassment in Sport: Perceptions and Experiences of American Female Student-Athletes, 32 INT’L 
REV. FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT 283 (1997).  See also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).  The Court explained, 
A professional football player's working environment is not severely 
or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the 
buttocks as he heads onto the field—even if the same behavior would 
reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach's secretary (male or 
female) back at the office. 
Id. 
148  See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2007).  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
defines sexual harassment as follows: 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other 
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual 
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either 
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's 
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an 
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operating within an institution are automatically placed in positions with 
more power than students.149  The status of the persons involved is 
important.150  One university’s policy explicitly states that “[s]exual 
harassment has more to do with power than with sex.”151  Although 
students and faculty may conduct themselves in the same harassing 
manner, faculty members are less likely than students to be aware of the 
effects of their power and the fact that their positions of power make 
them more likely to be perceived as harassers.152 
                                                                                                             
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such 
individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of 
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or 
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. 
Id.  See Fla. St. Univ. Student Conduct Code, available at http://askew.fsu.edu/current/ 
doctoral/studentpolicies.html. 
 Florida State University’s doctoral program states: 
The key elements of sexual harassment are that (a) there is a power 
imbalance between the faculty member and the student, with the 
faculty member taking advantage of this institutional authority and (b) 
there is emphasis in one way or another on the sexual identify [sic] of 
the harassed.  What is violated is not only a relationship of authority 
but also one of trust. 
Id.  See also MASS. COMMISS’N AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, MODEL SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
POLICY, http://www.mass.gov/mcad/harassment.html. 
The legal definition in Massachusetts for sexual harassment is as follows:  
“[S]sexual harassment” means sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors, and verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when:   
(a) submission to or rejection of such advances, requests or conduct is 
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment 
or as a basis for employment decisions; or,   
(b) such advances, requests or conduct have the purpose or effect of 
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance by 
creating an intimidating, hostile, humiliating or sexually offensive 
work environment. 
Id.  See also Univ. of Neb., Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity, 
http://www.unk.edu/offices/aaeo/index.php?id=1524.  University of Nebraska, Kearny 
adds:  “Sexual harassment differs from ordinary flirting because it occurs in the context of a 
power imbalance allowing one person to intimidate another person.”  Id. 
149 U.C.L.A. Student Psychological Services, Sexual Harassment Brochure, 
http://www.sps.ucla.edu/brochures_sexaulharssment.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).  See 
also Sophia Jowett & David Lavallee, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN SPORT 4 (Human Kinetics, 
2007).  The authors, Jowett and Lavallee, stress that “[t]he coach-athlete relationship is 
characterized by high levels of interdependence that can have positive or negative 
ramifications depending on how interdependence is experienced.”  Id. at 4. 
150 Ellen Sekreta, Sexual Harassment, Misconduct, and the Atmosphere of the Laboratory: The 
Legal and Professional Challenges Faced by Women Physical Science Researchers at Educational 
Institutions, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 115, 120 (Spring 2006).  The status of the harasser 
can even affect what he perceives to be harassing behavior.  Id. 
151 Univ. of Neb., Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity, http://www.unk.edu/offices/ 
aaeo/index.php?id=1524. 
152 Sekreta, supra note 150, at 121. 
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1. Coaches’ Control over Players 
Sexual harassment tends to be more rampant in hierarchical 
institutions with an unequal distribution of power among the parties; 
this is the typical structure of a college athletic team.153  The opportunity 
to harass is created by differences in power and position, leading the 
more powerful individual to extort various types of sexual 
gratification.154  An age disparity between the alleged harasser and the 
victim is also relevant in establishing whether a power imbalance exists 
that may add to a sexually hostile environment.155  For example, the 
majority of college coaches are men, and these men hold significant 
power over female athletes regarding scholarships, playing time, and 
team membership.156  The special relationship between coach and athlete 
                                                 
153 See generally Volkwein et al., supra note 147.  This type of sexual harassment is also 
present in the classroom, where teachers have the power and control over the student’s 
grades.  See Guidance (1997), supra note 95, at Introduction (introducing the different types 
of harassment that may present in the classroom).  If a teacher or other employee uses the 
authority he was given to force a student into a sexual situation, the employee “‘stands in 
the shoes’” of the school and the school should be liable for the use of its authority by the 
teacher or coach.  Id. at Liability of a School for Sexual Harassment.  
154 See Sekreta supra note 150, at 121.  A U.S. Department of Education pamphlet 
published in September 2008 notes that “[i]t is difficult to say ‘no’ to a . . . coach.. . . A 
person who complains about sexual harassment is often rejected . . . and labeled a 
troublemaker.”  DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CODE 16: SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT: IT’S NOT ACADEMIC 1997, http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/ 
docs/ocrshpam.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2008). 
155 Davis, 526 U.S at 651.  See also Jennings, 482 F.3d at 697.  Coach Dorrance also was 
much older than his players and wanted them to view him as a “father figure,” which 
would enhance their trust in him, and, in the end, further exacerbated the power 
imbalance.  Id.  At first, the district court did not appreciate the importance of this power 
imbalance and granted the school summary judgment.  Jennings, 444 F.3d at 255.  The 
plaintiff in Jennings also felt increased pressure because of the age difference between her 
and her coach.  Jennings, 482 F.3d at 697.  She recounted a story:  “I was 17 when he asked 
me [‘Who are you fucking?’] in a dark hotel room, knee-to-knee, bed not made, sitting at 
one of those tiny tables.”  Id.  See also Rhonda Reaves, “There's No Crying in Baseball”:  Sports 
and the Legal and Social Construction of Gender, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 283, 297–98 (2001) 
(commenting that usually when a plaintiff brings a Title IX hostile environment claim 
against a coach, the harasser is older than the victim and the age gap exacerbates a coach’s 
already powerful position over his younger athletes). 
156 Volkwein, et al., supra note 147, at 285–86.  The Women’s Sports Foundation’s position 
is that “[c]oaches exercise power over athletes, whether in giving them praise or criticism, 
evaluating them, making recommendations that further their athletic goals or conferring 
any other benefits on them.”  Melanie Bennett, et al., Sexual Harassment—Sexual Harassment 
and Sexual Relationships between Coaches, Other Athletic Personnel and Athletes:  The Foundation 
Position, Issues and Actions, Oct. 1, 2007, http://www.womenssportsfoundationote 
org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/coach/article.html?record=575.  See also Henderson, 469 F.3d at 
484.  Here, a high school coach made it known to his female players that complaints about 
coaching would result in a loss of playing time.  Id.  His coaching style also included 
obscenities, as he addressed his players in “demeaning and vulgar terms.”  Id.  After 
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is “‘all about emotions, about trust and about the body.’”157   
Coaches have significant control over the intimate details of an athlete’s 
life, such as their overall health, relationships, and sexual behavior; this 
demonstrates that coaches have even more control over an athlete than a 
professor would have over a student.158  The Jennings court pointed out 
that “[a] typical college coach is going to have much more informal, 
casual, one-on-one contact with a student-athlete than a typical 
university instructor will have with a student.”159  Coaches also exert 
power through praise and criticism of the athlete and by imposing 
restrictions on the athlete’s personal life.160  These factors combine and 
make athletes particularly susceptible to a coach’s abuse of power and 
control.161 
In Jennings, the coach in question was the most successful women’s 
soccer coach in history and had tremendous power over the players.162  
                                                                                                             
pursuing a relationship with one of his high school players, the coach “threatened the 
entire team with ‘consequences’ if anyone disclosed his relationship with [her].”  Id.  
Another player testified she knew that the player being pursued by the coach was 
uncomfortable with his advances.  Id.  In addition, the player testified that behavior 
exhibited by the coach, including fondling, kissing, and hugging, was unwelcome and 
offensive to the targeted player. Id.  The threatened loss of playing time not only impeded 
reporting but also magnified the already-present power imbalance.  See also infra Part III.C 
(discussing the result when power imbalances and a weak standard combine in the college 
athletic environment). 
157 Finn, supra note 109, at 11 (quoting Don Sabo, a sociology professor at D'Youville 
College in Buffalo, who has developed harassment workshops for coaches). 
158 Volkwein, et al., supra note 147, at 285.  See also Finn supra note 109, at 11.  A person 
Finn interviewed commented, “When you put a male in a position of power where he can 
manipulate something of real meaning to an athlete, such as playing time or a scholarship, 
then add in the possibility of a young girl who may have a crush, you’ve got an extremely 
dangerous mix.”  Id. 
159 Jennings, 444 F.3d at 274.   See also R.V. Acosta & L.J. Carpenter, Women in Intercollegiate 
Sport:  A Longitudinal Study—Twenty-Nine Year Update, 1977-2006, in EQUAL PLAY:  TITLE IX 
AND SOCIAL CHANGE 169 (Andrew Zimbalist & Nancy Hogshead-Makar, eds., 2007).  
Statistics show the grim reality of Title IX: in 2006 only 42.4% of women’s teams (and less 
than 2% of men’s teams) were led by a female head coach—the lowest level of 
representation ever, down from more than 90% when Title IX was enacted.  Id.  
160 Nancy Hogshead-Makar & Sheldon Elliot Steinbach, Intercollegiate Athletics’ Unique 
Environments for Sexual Harassment Claims:  Balancing the Realities of Athletics with Preventing 
Potential Claims, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 173, 174 (2003). 
161 Deanna DeFrancesco, Jennings v. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill: Title IX, 
Intercollegiate Athletics and Sexual Harassment, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 1271, 1293–94 (2007).  
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN:  A CASE OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION 1 (1979).  For example, according to noted scholar Catherine MacKinnon, 
sexual harassment is the “unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a 
relationship of unequal power.”  Id. 
162 Jennings, 482 F.3d at 696.  See Jennings, 444 F.3d at 274.  The district court in 
Jennings also elaborated on the unusual role of a coach:  
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The disparity in power between the coach and his players “trapped 
players into responding to his questions and enduring the 
environment.”163  The coach controlled everything, from team 
membership to scholarship eligibility.164  Any type of power imbalance 
must be examined in an allegation of sexual harassment because “[i]f the 
court does not perceive a power imbalance, it may weigh strongly 
against a finding of harassment.”165  These types of power imbalances are 
not restricted to coaches—any member of the athletic personnel staff 
may have some type of power over the athlete. 
2. Other Positions of Power over Players 
Not only do coaches exercise a substantial amount of control over 
their players, but athletic trainers, the athletic director, and other 
administrative officials also have power over the student-athletes.166  
Athletic directors, along with the coach, control the scholarship dollars, 
practice times, game publicity, equipment purchases, and many other 
day-to-day details in the athlete’s life.167  The athletic trainers are 
                                                                                                             
College sports often involve long daily practice sessions, overnight 
travel, . . . and the need for a coach to discuss issues associated with 
academic performance, athletics performance, and health . . . .  
Additionally, . . .   a college coach is much more likely to demonstrate 
an athletic move with a hands-on demonstration. . . .  Likewise, some 
coaches will use profanity, slang, sarcasm, or hamhanded humor. . .to 
make a point, or to motivate. 
Id. 
163 Jennings, 482 F.3d at 697.  See Crandell v. N.Y. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 87 F.Supp.2d 
304, 319 (S.D. N.Y. 2000) (denying summary judgment because the unequal power 
relationship between harasser and victim could feasibly support a jury finding of the 
establishment of a sexually hostile environment). 
164 Jennings, 482 F.3d at 697.  Interestingly, even before matriculation, the plaintiff was a 
walk-on and was never recommended for a scholarship.  Id. at 709. 
165 DeFrancesco, supra note 161, at 1295. 
166 See supra Part III.B (discussing power imbalances).  Hogshead-Makar, supra note 160, 
at 184. 
The identity of and relationship between the alleged harasser and the 
subject or subjects of the harassment [will be considered by the OCR in 
investigating allegations of sexual harassment] . . . For example, due to 
the power a professor or teacher [or coach] has over a student, sexually 
based conduct by that person toward a student is more likely to create 
a hostile environment than similar conduct by another student. 
Id. 
167 See supra Part II.A.  Revised Guideline, supra note 20, at V.A.1.  The OCR Revised 
Guidance specifically gives the existence of a power imbalance (the “identity of and 
relationship between the alleged harasser and the subject or subjects of the harassment[]”) 
as a factor to be considered, especially in cases involving allegations of sexual harassment 
of a student by a school employee.  Id. 
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responsible for the athlete’s health and wellness; this includes clearing 
the player to play after an injury.168  The power to tell an athlete when he 
or she can play again with the team is indeed a great power.169  Other 
administrative officials within the athletic office at a university may also 
exhibit great power over the athletes regarding ticketing for games, class 
schedules, and perhaps most importantly, act as a direct pipeline to the 
coach himself.170  Student-athletes clearly are at the bottom of the power 
structure. 
This power imbalance therefore creates a hierarchical structure 
fraught with opportunities for harassment.171  In addition, the 
“appropriate official” who needs to receive notice of harassment 
typically is a powerful official with whom the athlete may not be 
familiar, such as an administrator who is not in the gym or on the 
playing field everyday.172  Most likely, the power imbalance between the 
student victim and the official is great, which makes it unlikely that an 
athlete would report the incident.173  It is unrealistic to expect the athlete 
                                                 
168 This is an immense power over an athlete, as clearing a player to play is usually a 
judgment call, perhaps made based on some physical tests, but in the end the power to 
play lies with the trainer.  The level of competitiveness within the team for playing time is 
also quite high:  an extended period of sitting out for an injury could have a serious 
detrimental effect on the athlete’s career.  See Barbara Osborne, Principles of Liability for 
Athletic Trainers:  Managing Sport-Related Concussion, 36 J. ATHL. TRAIN. 316 (July–Sept. 
2001); Gerald Eskenazi, ATHLETE AND HEALTH: MANY AT RISK, New York Times, March 11, 
1990 at sec. 8, p. 1 (discussing the pressure to clear athletes as soon as possible). See also 
Benito J. Velasquez, Sexual Harassment: A Concern for the Athletic Trainer, 33 J. Athl. Train. 
171, 172, 174 (June 1998). Id.  Sexual harassment is of grave concern for athletic trainers in 
such a pressure-filled position. Id.   
169 See supra note 166.  Many schools have both professional and student athletic trainers 
on staff.  See supra note 166 (discussing power imbalance, which can also exist between 
students, as a factor to be considered in sexual harassment cases). 
170 See generally supra note 156.  See Davis, 526 U.S. at 653 (“The relationship between the 
harasser and the victim necessarily affects the extent to which the misconduct can be said 
to breach Title IX's guarantee of equal access to educational benefits[.]”); Patricia H. v. 
Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist, 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1297 (1993) (commenting that the “‘grave 
disparity in age and power’ between harasser and victim contributed to the creation of a 
hostile environment”); Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 95 at n.57 (“‘impact of 
the . . . remarks was heightened by the fact that the coach is an adult in a position of 
authority’”).  See also note 150 (faculty may not realize their behavior is harassing). 
171 See Jowett & Lavallee, supra note 149, at 42.  “[C]oaches and parents often have power 
over the athlete to dictate behavior and access to valued resources.”  Id. 
172 See supra text accompanying note 71 (showing that, at a minimum, the official must 
have the power to enact corrective measures). 
173 See supra Part II.C (explaining the notice standard and that one of the clearest ways of 
receiving notice is through a report).  See also Press Release, Committee on Education and 
Labor, U.S. House of Representatives, While Progress Has Been Made, More Must Be Done to 
Strengthen and Enforce Title IX (June 19, 2007), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/ 
list/speech/edlabor_dem/RelJune19.html.  “[I]n many cases, female students . . . do not 
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to report her coach—who holds the power of her scholarship, her 
playing time, and her social life—to an “appropriate official” who has a 
close working relationship with the coach.174  Because of the typical 
tightly-knit atmosphere in the field of athletics, it is likely that the coach, 
the athletic director, and others in the office are friendly with each other, 
making the prospect of reporting a coach or other staff member for 
sexual harassment especially difficult.175  The power structure inherent 
on a team can impede the successful use of procedural safeguards 
implemented to address sexual harassment.176 
As discussed above, Jennings provides an example of how the 
extreme power imbalance that exists between a coach and a player may 
enable sexual harassment.177  In Jennings, the athlete was worried she 
would lose her playing time or place on the team if she refused her 
coach’s demands to discuss sexual issues.178  Just as importantly, the 
power imbalance impeded her intentions of reporting the harassment.179  
The player was not comfortable confronting her coach, and the power 
                                                                                                             
report Title IX complaints to their schools because they are either unaware of the law’s 
protections or they fear retaliation.”  Id. 
174 It is difficult, then, to determine who the courts would find to be an “appropriate 
official” in harassment cases in athletics.  See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.  According to Gebser, it 
must be an official “who at a minimum has authority to institute corrective measures on 
the district's behalf[.]”  Id.  
175 See supra Part II.  According to the Women’s Sports Foundation, sexual relationships 
between coaches and athletes are inappropriate because the coach has professional 
responsibility for the athlete.  It also makes the atmosphere uncomfortable for others within 
the program and tends to increase the chances for a coach to abuse his power.  See, e.g., 
Bennett, supra note 156 (discussing the power coaches have over their players).    
176 See supra Part III.B (discussing the power imbalance and other problems inherent in 
the existing reporting structures). 
177 See supra Part III.B (discussing the power imbalance between Coach Dorrance and a 
college soccer player). 
178 Jennings, 444 F.3d. at 293.  See also Turner v. McQuarter, 79 F.Supp.2d 911 (N.D. Ill. 
1999).  A player at Chicago State University engaged in a sexual relationship with her 
coach, which she alleged she would not have done except she was afraid that her refusal to 
do so would have adverse consequences for her regarding her playing time, difficult 
practice conditions, and even her “‘ability to graduate[.]’”  Id. at 913–14. 
179 Jennings, 444 F.3d at 293.  Jennings went to the university’s legal counsel and reported 
the harassment and her feelings of discomfort, but the counsel brushed it off by telling 
Jennings that her coach was a “‘great guy’” and to “‘work it out’” with the coach.  Id.  The 
university counsel then “‘shov[ed] [Jennings] out the door.’”  Id.  This is an example of the 
university community being very tight knit, making it difficult and perhaps pointless for 
an athlete to report sexual harassment to a friend of the person who harassed her.  Jennings, 
482 F.3d at 693.  Sending Jennings back to her coach to deal with this issue was clearly an 
unreasonable method of dealing with her harassment because her coach exerted a great 
deal of power over her life and because his actions were the very problem she was 
reporting.  See id.; see also infra Part IV (proposing alternatives reporting mechanisms that 
could avoid that problem). 
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structure impeded any attempt at reporting the harassment.180  In this 
case, the power structure precluded Jennings from having a person to 
whom she could realistically report the harassment and be taken 
seriously.  Similarly, the power imbalance inherent in college athletics 
creates an atmosphere specifically conducive to sexual harassment, and 
then impedes reporting because the coach or other official is either the 
very person to whom the athlete is expected to report or has a close 
working relationship with that person.181  This example demonstrates 
how the requirement of actual notice in the hierarchical environment of 
college athletics allows sexual harassment to continue, unfettered.182 
C. Betraying Title IX:  The Weakened Gebser Standard and Existing Power 
Imbalances Allow Institutions to Form Procedures Which Merely React to 
Sexual Harassment 
Unfortunately, “[d]espite the public attention that sexual harassment 
in athletics has received lately, few institutions have thoroughly 
addressed whether general institutional sexual harassment policies are 
effective and suitable in the context of intercollegiate athletics.”183  While 
much attention has been given to the tests for determining compliance in 
funding and providing equal athletic opportunities, a great weakness in 
the Title IX regulatory scheme is that procedures and tests for 
compliance with sexual harassment regulations have not received similar 
attention.184  This is especially apparent in the world of collegiate 
athletics—a complicated environment where an unbalanced power 
                                                 
180 Jennings commented that she did not feel comfortable talking to her coach about his 
behavior, and clearly talking with the school’s legal counsel did not help either, as the 
counsel was not willing to take the complaint seriously because she thought the coach was 
a “‘great guy.’”  Jennings, 444 F.3d at 293–94.  See also infra Part IV (suggesting amendments 
to the OCR regulations that would address the issues created by power imbalances). 
181 To compound this matter, these are usually also the same officials that must have 
notice in order for the school to be liable.  See supra Part III.B. 
182 See infra Part III.C (exploring the depth of the dangerous relationship between the 
Gebser standard and power imbalances in college athletics). 
183 Hogshead-Makar, supra note 160, at 174. 
184 See infra note 212 (articulating the three prong test used to determine equality in 
athletic funding).  See also 20 U.S.C. §§ 3413, 3441 (2000).  The OCR is responsible for 
enforcement of Title IX.  Id.  See also supra note 12 and accompanying text for an example 
of regulations passed to enforce Title IX.  The OCR has also issued a series of letters, 
guidances, and regulations to assist in enforcing Title IX.  See, e.g., Revised Guidance, supra 
note 20; Dear Colleague letter April 26, supra note 120; USDOJ Coordination & Review, 
supra note 31; SEXUAL HARASSMENT:  IT’S NOT ACADEMIC, supra note 154.  See infra Part III.C 
(analyzing certain OCR recommendations). 
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structure leaves the athlete especially vulnerable to sexual harassment, 
yet without adequate avenues to pursue procedural safeguards.185 
Prevention was an important goal of Title IX, as demonstrated by the 
focus in the text of the statute on the benefited class rather than on the 
perpetrator.186  However, the jurisprudence interpreting Gebser has 
exploited the standard so as to provide many loopholes for institutions 
to avoid legal liability.187  The answers to questions regarding who the 
appropriate school official is and what constitutes actual notice remain 
unclear.188  A school, to avoid legal liability, needs to take only those 
reactive measures that do not exhibit deliberate indifference to sexual 
harassment.  In fact, many schools do just that.189  Technically, a school 
can allow its vulnerable athletes to be injured, so long as appropriate 
measures are taken later to protect the school from legal liability.190  Even 
though the OCR has implemented several regulations indicating the 
need for greater protection for athletes, schools have not been held to 
these requirements.191  In the end, athletes are still vulnerable to 
powerful coaches and other officials.192  Taken together, the power 
imbalance and the poorly-constructed standard result in institutions 
                                                 
185 See supra Part III.B (discussing the power imbalances existent in postsecondary 
athletics). 
186 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 677. 
187 See supra Part III.A (analyzing the watered down interpretation of the standard). 
188 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing actual notice). 
189 Supra at Part II.C.  In Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 73 (1st Cir. 2007), the 
school talked to the boy involved and separated the victim’s desk from the harasser, but 
the harassment continued for some time.  The court found that “a claim that the school 
system could or should have done more is insufficient to establish deliberate 
indifference[.]”  Id.  The court emphasized that the actions the school takes need to be 
clearly unreasonable.  Id. (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 648).  In conclusion, the circuit court 
found that “[t]he test for whether a school should be liable under Title IX for student-on-
student harassment is not one of effectiveness by hindsight.”  Id. at 74. 
190 See supra Part III.A (discussing the legal requirements to avoid liability). 
191 See Frequently Asked Questions about Sexual Harassment, Department of Education, 
Office for Civil Rights, last modified Jan 26, 2006, http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ 
ocr/qa-sexharass.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2008).  OCR investigates and resolves 
complaints alleging that educational institutions that are recipients of federal funds have 
failed to protect students from harassment based on sex.  Id.  “Complaints are often 
resolved by agreements requiring schools to adopt effective anti-harassment policies and 
procedures, train staff and students, address the incidents in question, and . . . take other 
steps to restore a nondiscriminatory environment.”  Id.  See Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 398–400; 
Rosa H. v. San Elizario Ind. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997).  In at least two decisions, 
Canutillo and Rosa H., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Title IX law in a manner 
inconsistent with OCR’s longstanding policy and practice.  See Canutillo, 101 F.3d at 398–
400; Rosa H., 106 F.3d 648. 
192 See supra Parts III.B.1–2 (discussing the different types of power that coaches, athletic 
trainers, athletic directors, and other athletic personnel have over the athlete, who relies on 
this group of people for his or her well-being). 
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concentrating on reactive procedures that hinge on inefficient reporting 
mechanisms that apply only after the damage has already been done to 
the student.193 
1. Few Strengths and Many Weaknesses of Current Policies  
The Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance provides direction as to 
investigation techniques, appropriate measures, and proper restitution 
after sexual harassment is discovered.194  Preventative measures, which 
are few, have generally been poorly implemented and have fallen short 
of achieving any meaningful goal.195  Although the Supreme Court has 
not yet ruled on what constitutes appropriate remedial or preventative 
measures, some schools have adopted some type of program regarding 
sexual harassment.196 
One of the most comprehensive Title IX plans includes a definition 
of sexual harassment, detailed procedures regarding dissemination of 
the policy, designated reporting protocol, formal requirements for 
investigating sexual harassment claims, and enforcement information.197  
In reporting sexual harassment, the online brochure lists several people 
available for receiving reports, including various supervisors, managers, 
                                                 
193 Preventative measures are needed because writing a check to an athlete after sexual 
harassment has occurred cannot really redress the injury already done.  See generally Liza 
H. Gold, SEXUAL HARASSMENT:  PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION 
(2004).  “[E]xpert testimony that establishes the existence of a psychological injury and a 
casual connection between the emotional distress and the defendant’s conduct can be 
crucial in the assessment of liability in sexual harassment cases.”  Id. at 172. 
194 See supra Parts II.A, III.C (discussing OCR regulations). 
195 See infra Part III.C.2 (comparing the lack of preventative measures in athletics with 
those that are standard in the workplace where training seminars, informative articles, 
brochures, and power point presentations are all a part of preventing harassment from ever 
occurring).  See, e.g., AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrim. § 858 (2007) (including prevention as an 
important tool to fight harassment); Martha Neil, Tips for Preventing Sexual Harassment, 
ABA JOURNAL: LAW NEWS NOW, Oct. 15, 2007, http://www.abajournal.com/news/ 
tips_for_preventing_sexual_harassment/ (same). 
196 See Guidance supra note 20, at IX (noting that schools are not required to create a 
sexual harassment policy as long as its non-discrimination policy and procedures for 
handling discrimination complaints are effective in eliminating all types of sex 
discrimination, including sexual harassment).  See also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 306 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Gebser, would reserve the issue of “whether a 
district should be relieved from damages liability if it has in place, and effectively 
publicizes and enforces, a policy to curtail and redress injuries caused by sexual 
harassment.”  Id.  Justice Ginsburg commented that she would accept an effective policy for 
reporting and redressing sexual harassment as an affirmative defense to a Title IX claim for 
damages.  Id. at 307 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
197 Infra note 211 (the policy referenced is that of University of California Berkeley).  See 
supra Parts II.A, III.C (discussing the Guidance). 
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a Title IX Compliance Officer, and other designated employees.198  This is 
a very strong policy that includes many key elements recommended by 
the OCR, elements integral to preventing sexual harassment from ever 
occurring.199 
For example, widely disseminating a policy against harassment 
establishes an overall community atmosphere that refuses to accept or 
condone harassment as a natural part of the environment; this goes a 
long way toward prevention.200  It is also important to clearly state which 
individuals are available to receive reports of grievances.201  The most 
obvious limitation to a plan like this is that it was clearly written with the 
Gebser standard as a reference point, that is, focusing on avoiding legal 
liability.202  A possible weakness with this type of plan is that with a 
narrowing interpretation, courts could determine that school officials 
absent from the list do not qualify as persons who can legally receive 
“actual notice” in order to trigger school liability.203  A school could 
remedy this dilemma by adding language that the persons able to 
receive notice include, but are not limited to, those names on the list. 
Finally, another flaw in most of these plans may not be in the written 
policy itself but in the implementation of the policy.204  It is one thing to 
write an appropriate policy, but the policy must also be followed, 
established, and made known to coaches, athletic directors, other 
                                                 
198 See infra note 211 (discussing the University of California Berkeley’s Title IX policy 
which directs students to the correct person for reporting harassment on campus).  
199 Clearly, this is the institution’s ultimate goal.  See SEXUAL HARASSMENT:  IT’S NOT 
ACADEMIC, supra note 154.  The OCR comments that a school may “conduct periodic sexual 
harassment awareness training for all school staff, including administrators, teachers, and 
guidance counselors[.]”  Id. 
200 See Hogshead-Makar supra note 160, at 177.  “Sexual harassment guidelines that 
prohibit romantic relationships encourage prevention by firmly admonishing the entire 
athletic community that the athletes are not an acceptable group of candidates from which 
coaches are to draw their intimate partners.”  Id. 
201 See, e.g., Revised Guidance supra note 20.  The Guidance states that “providing 
students with several avenues to report sexual harassment is a very helpful means for 
addressing and preventing sexually harassing conduct in the first place.”  Guidance (1997) 
supra note 103, at n.64. 
202 See Finn supra note 109, at 11 (the director of the NCAA education department seemed 
to be resigned to litigating sexual harassment, instead of preventing it: “‘The policy was in 
the plan to look at down the road, but maybe we need to look at it sooner.  For now, the 
final recourse for athletes is litigation:  the issue of harassment is so complex, so laden with 
people's own biases and blind spots, that the law and liability may be the only way to catch 
their attention.’”). 
203 See supra Part II.C (explaining the clarified standard). 
204 See generally supra Part III.B (emphasizing the difficulty with which any reporting 
procedure could be implemented in an athletic office if the athletes are expected to report 
incidents to one of the coach’s close acquaintances). 
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officials, and, most importantly, athletes.205  This additional practice will 
assist in preventing sexual harassment from being a problem.206  In 
addition, the policy must be publicly disseminated.207  An additional 
obvious weakness is the absence of educational training seminars as 
hands-on training.208  The OCR discusses these types of seminars that, 
while standard practice in the workplace, are absent in post-secondary 
athletics.209 
2. The Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights’ 
Recommended Regulations 
The Department of Education requires schools that receive federal 
funds to monitor third parties for discrimination and to refrain from 
particular forms of interaction with outside entities that are known to 
discriminate.210  Most schools also have their own policies on sexual 
discrimination, while a smaller number have policies dealing directly 
with sexual harassment. 211 
                                                 
205 See P. Solomon Bandy, Colorado Reinstates Barnett, Plans Changes to Athletic Department, 
USA TODAY, May 27, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/big12/ 
2004-05-27-colorado-barnett-announcement_x.htm.  This was the case at Colorado 
University which, after allegations of rape and sexual assault at recruiting parties, 
implemented a “‘sweeping’ overhaul of the athletics department intended to boost 
oversight, clamp down on its autonomy and place a new emphasis on academic 
achievement.”  Id.  Some of the changes were initiated by the academic faculty, including 
having the athletics department report to the top campus academics overseer, rather than a 
separate chancellor.  Id.  See also Simpson, 500 F.3d 1170. 
206 See Kracunas, 119 F.3d at 88.  Incidental inconveniences caused to colleges and 
universities by efforts to educate faculty and staff about sexual harassment and to 
implement effective sexual harassment policies are justified in light of colleges’ legitimate 
goal, under Title IX, of eradicating sexual harassment.  Id. 
207 See infra Part IV.B (suggesting an amended regulation to increase implementation of 
preventive sexual harassment policies). 
208 See, e.g., Finn supra note 109, at 11.  “‘Maybe it takes something like [the Jennings case] 
before people's consciousness gets raised and policies get enforced,’ [head soccer coach at 
the University of Virginia] Heinrich said.  ‘I think institutions have a responsibility to 
educate their coaches.’”  Id.  Interestingly, Heinrich played for Dorrance at North Carolina.  
Id. 
209 See supra note 195 (discussing standard preventative measures taken in the 
workplace). 
210 See, e.g., 34 CFR §§ 106.31(b)(6), 106.31(d), 106.37(a)(2), 106.38(a), 106.51(a)(3) (1998)  
(regulations specifying groups covered by Title IX and articulating sexually harassing 
behavior prohibited as a manner of sexual discrimination). 
211 See, e.g., University of Wyoming Guidelines to Prevent Sexual Harassment, 
http://uwadmnweb.uwyo.edu/EmploymentPractices/guidelines_to_prevent_sexual_har.
htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2007); University of Colorado at Boulder Sexual Harassment 
Policy and Procedures, https://www.cu.edu/policies/Personnel/sexharass.html  (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2007); Valparaiso University Employment Requirements, 
http://www.valpo.edu/finaid/beforework.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2007) (All new 
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The Office for Civil Rights has promulgated a Guidance and issued 
several “Dear Colleague” letters with recommended standards for 
investigating and enforcing sexual harassment claims in an educational 
setting.212  However, these standards are not mandatory, and the 
Guidance serves merely as guidance. 213  The Office has also published a 
pamphlet that provides school administrators, teachers, students, and 
parents with basic information to assist them in recognizing and 
addressing sexual harassment under Title IX.214 
The Guidance explains that an educational institution’s 
responsibilities, as a condition of receiving federal financial assistance, 
are to take “immediate and effective steps to end sexual harassment 
when it occurs, prevent its recurrence, and remedy its effects.”215  Title IX 
regulations require post-secondary recipients to designate a Title IX 
Coordinator, adopt and disseminate a public nondiscrimination policy, 
and enact grievance procedures to address complaints of discrimination 
                                                                                                             
employees are required to take a training course entitled Sexual Harassment Prevention as 
part of their employment at Valparaiso University); Boston University Sexual Harassment 
Policy, http://www.bu.edu/handbook/policies/hr/harassment.html (last visited Oct. 12, 
2007); University of Berkeley Campus Climate and Compliance: Title IV & Title IX (Aug. 
2005) http://ccac.berkeley.edu/titleix.shtml [hereinafter Berkeley].  See also Waters v. 
Metro. St. Univ., 91 F.Supp.2d 1287, 1293 (D. Minn. 2000), stating that: 
In the absence of a statutory prohibition on such behavior [a professor 
or coach dating a student], the Court would hope that colleges and 
universities would take steps to police such activities internally, to set 
higher standards than those required by law so as to insure an 
academic environment which is devoted utterly to the goals of 
learning and education rather than to the amorous pursuit[.] 
Id. 
212 See Revised Guidance, supra note 20; Dear Colleague Apr. 26, supra note 120; SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT: IT’S NOT ACADEMIC, supra note 154.  This Guidance provides a strong 
starting point for analysis.  Title IX Legal Manual, supra note 46.  In addition, the Guidance 
provides institutions with a three prong test to determine whether they are in compliance 
with Title IX in regards to athletic programs:  first, the intercollegiate participation 
opportunities for male and female students are “substantial[ly] proportion[ate]” to their 
respective undergraduate enrollments; second, the school has a “history and continuing 
practice of program expansion” for the underrepresented sex; and third, the school “fully 
and effectively” accommodates the underrepresented sex.    Dear Colleague letter from 
Gerald Reynolds, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, to Colleague, FURTHER 
CLARIFICATION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS POLICY GUIDANCE REGARDING TITLE IX 
COMPLIANCE (July 11, 2003) http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/title9guidance 
Final.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
213 Id.  See supra notes 20–23 (discussing specific requirements promulgated in the Code 
of Federal Regulations). 
214 SEXUAL HARASSMENT:  IT’S NOT ACADEMIC, supra note 154. 
215 Dear Colleague letter from Stephanie Monroe, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights 
(Jan. 25, 2006) http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/sexhar-2006.html 
(emphasis added). 
Schroeder: Power Imbalances in College Athletics and an Exploited Standard:
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
1526 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
on the basis of sex in educational programs and activities.216  The OCR 
has specifically stated that a policy against sex discrimination is one of 
the most effective tools for preventing sexual harassment.217  Such a 
policy informs students, parents, and employees that sexual harassment 
will not be tolerated.218  Therefore, while the courts have not emphasized 
the importance of prevention, the Department of Education has recently 
identified prevention as one goal (however minor) of Title IX.219 
However, it is extremely unfortunate that even the Revised 
Guidance makes clear that there are ways for schools to avoid legal 
liability when it states,  “If the school takes these steps, it has avoided 
violating Title IX.”220  The focus on reactive measures in the Guidance 
continues, “[B]ecause a school will have the opportunity to take 
reasonable corrective action before OCR issues a formal finding of 
violation, a school does not risk losing its Federal funding solely because 
discrimination occurred.”221  Another problem with the OCR’s 
guidelines, recommendations, and other advice is that failure to comply 
with these regulations does not establish the actual notice or deliberate 
indifference needed for legal liability.222  The OCR has reviewed Title IX 
compliance within the post-secondary school system and has discovered 
that many recipients have not complied with all of the requirements of 
                                                 
216 34 C.F.R. § 106.9, 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a), 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b).  See also Dear Colleague 
letter Apr. 26, supra note 120; Dear Colleague letter from Kenneth L. Marcus, Office for 
Civil Rights, Title IX GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES, POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, (Aug. 4, 2004), 
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/responsibilities_ix_ps.html (last visited Jan. 
20, 2008) (while aimed at pure discriminatory behavior, other Title IX regulations can 
provide direction for sexual harassment grievance procedures). 
217 Revised Guidance, supra note 20, at VIII.  It is unfortunate that roughly 75% of the 
Guidance focuses on reaction to harassment but has a mere three sentences in the 
“Prevention” section.  Id.  It does, however, imply that more prevention is needed:  
“Further, training for administrators, teachers, and staff and age-appropriate classroom 
information for students can help to ensure that they understand what types of conduct 
can cause sexual harassment and that they know how to respond.”  Id. 
218 SEXUAL HARASSMENT:  IT’S NOT ACADEMIC, supra note 154. 
219 See supra Part II.A (discussing the original goal of Title IX).  See generally Policy 
Interpretation-Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 45 C.F.R. pt. 26 (1979).  The 
Department of Education has interpreted Title IX provisions as they apply to traditional 
educational institutions.  Id. 
220 Revised Guidance, supra note 20, at V.B.1. 
221 Revised Guidance, supra note 20, at VI.  The Guidance continues, “If the school has 
taken, or agrees to take, each of these steps, OCR will consider the case against the school 
resolved and will take no further action, other than monitoring compliance with an 
agreement, if any, between the school and OCR.”  Id.  Clearly, the focus is on acting after 
the fact.  See id. 
222 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292.  One option is for the Department of Education to enforce the 
regulation administratively:  “Agencies generally have authority to promulgate and 
enforce requirements that effectuate the statute's nondiscrimination mandate[.]” Id. (citing 
20 U.S.C. § 1682). 
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the Title IX implementing regulations.223  Examples of missing 
requirements included a general failure to designate and train at least 
one school official to be the Title IX Coordinator, a failure to have and 
publicly disseminate notice of the nondiscrimination policy, and a failure 
to adopt and publish Title IX grievance procedures to address sex 
discrimination claims.224  These deficiencies directly correlate to the 
weakened Gebser standard because, clearly, schools are focusing on 
reacting instead of preventing.225 
It is much easier for schools to concentrate on reacting properly to 
sexual harassment allegations rather than preventing them, as the 
Supreme Court has said that the school shall not be deliberately 
indifferent once it has notice of harassment.226  However, these reactive 
measures are insufficient because the athlete has already been injured.227  
The purely reactionary system relies on the athlete reporting the 
harassment to a person with whom she may not be comfortable because 
of the power imbalance.228  It is not being claimed that reactive measures 
are an evil; to the contrary, remedial measures are needed if 
discrimination is discovered.229  However, post-secondary schools need 
                                                 
223 Dear Colleague letter Aug 4, 2004, supra note 216.  See Revised Guidance, supra note 
20, at VI.  Normally, the OCR does not become involved until a complaint is filed:   
If OCR is asked to investigate or otherwise resolve incidents of sexual 
harassment of students, including incidents caused by employees, 
other students, or third parties, OCR will consider whether—(1) the 
school has a disseminated policy prohibiting sex discrimination under 
Title IX  and effective grievance procedures;  (2) the school 
appropriately investigated or otherwise responded to allegations of 
sexual harassment; and (3) the school has taken immediate and 
effective corrective action responsive to the harassment, including 
effective actions to end the harassment, prevent its recurrence, and, as 
appropriate, remedy its effects.   
Id. 
224 Revised Guidance, supra note 20, at VI.  Even under OCR’s optimistic administrative 
enforcement scheme, “recipients always receive actual notice and the opportunity to take 
appropriate corrective action before any finding of violation or possible loss of federal 
funds.”  Id., at V.B.1. 
225 See supra Part III.C (discussing school policies; schools with reactive policies and 
concrete grievance procedures are considered to be at the forefront of the battle against 
sexual harassment). 
226 See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 274 (noting that this is disappointing, considering that the 
majority in Gebser found that Title IX focuses on protecting individuals from recipients of 
federal funds rather than on compensating victims of discrimination).   
227 A damages check cannot fully repair the athlete if he or she has been sexually 
harassed.   
228 See supra Part III.B (examining the power imbalances inherent in college athletics and 
detailing the way in which this power imbalance can impede reporting mechanisms). 
229 See 28 C.F.R. §54.110 (2000).  The common rule provides:  
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to pay more attention to complying with the preventative measures 
described by the OCR.230  Schools should take interest beyond 
preventing legal liability and should seek to give their athletes the 
educational opportunity Title IX was intended to protect by preventing 
sexual harassment on athletes.231 
In particular, as discussed earlier, the athlete is especially vulnerable 
because of her position at the bottom of the power hierarchy.232  Reactive 
measures will not make the athlete whole again.233  This is why it is 
important for athletic offices to establish a strongly worded sexual 
harassment policy that will “communicate a set of institutional values 
and a code of behavior that [will] go a long way towards preventing an 
environment of sexual harassment.”234  A change in the Title IX standard 
would increase a school’s interest in stopping sexual harassment, and 
additional OCR regulations would promote prevention and facilitate 
reporting of sexual harassment in the athletic environment.235 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
The enforcement of Title IX in athletics is impeded by a two-part 
problem of an exploited interpretation of the Gebser standard and the 
inherent power structure that exists in athletics.236  When these two 
problems combine, the result is that institutions form the bare minimum 
in reactive measures and do not prevent sexual harassment.237  Until 
athletic offices promulgate a proactive sexual harassment policy and are 
                                                                                                             
(a) Remedial action[:]  If the designated agency official finds that a 
recipient has discriminated against persons on the basis of sex in an 
education program or activity, such recipient shall take such remedial 
action as the designated agency official deems necessary to overcome 
the effects of such discrimination. 
Id. 
230 See supra notes 20–23 (describing OCR regulations). 
231 See generally Finn, supra note 109, at 11 (drawing attention to the new risks presented 
because of the increased number of women participating in sports).  “‘There’s more 
opportunity for female athletes than ever before, but the flip side is that there’s more risk to 
those athletes because we haven’t developed policies, legislation and screening processes to 
keep up with the social progress made by Title IX.’”  Id. 
232 See supra Part III.B (discussing the power hierarchy). 
233 See infra Part IV (suggesting changes in the OCR regulations to focus on preventing 
the harassment). 
234 Hogshead-Makar, supra note 160, at 173–74. 
235 See infra Part IV.A (suggesting the Court adopt a new standard for school liability); 
Part IV.B (proposing amendments to OCR regulations). 
236 See supra Part III.A (discussing the Gebser interpretation) and Part III.B (exploring the 
power imbalance). 
237 See supra Part III.C (explaining how the power imbalance and the Gebser language 
result in weakened policies). 
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held to it by the OCR, sexual harassment on the playing field and in the 
locker room will continue to be a danger for athletes.238 
Sexual harassment should not be the price an athlete is required to 
pay to play his or her sport of choice at a highly competitive level.239  
Even the OCR’s Revised Guidance does not provide enough focus on 
proactive measures to prevent sexual harassment.240  In addition, while 
compliance with these measures is a “requirement” for federally funded 
schools, the reality is that this is not enforced until there is a problem, so 
that the Department of Education is merely putting out fires instead of 
educating about and preventing harassment.241  A college should be 
required to enact strict policies against sexual harassment and player-
coach sexual relationships, publicly disseminate these policies, 
thoroughly screen coaches before hiring them, and provide athletes with 
easily accessible personnel outside of the power sphere of the coaches to 
which they may report harassment.242 
A. Proposed Department of Education Regulations to Prevent Sexual 
Harassment 
The Department of Education’s regulatory requirements are 
insufficient to prevent sexual harassment.  The OCR agency enforcement 
scheme must lead the way in amending school liability for sexual 
harassment in college athletics.243  While the OCR regulations must not 
go beyond Title IX language, they may further the congressional intent 
behind Title IX.244  In addition, by adopting these regulations, schools 
and athletic officials will demonstrate the school’s set of values, which 
will prevent an environment of sexual harassment from developing.245 
                                                 
238 See supra Part II.A (exploring the OCR’s administrative regulations intended to clarify 
Title IX). 
239 See supra Parts II.D, III.B (discussing the Jennings case, in which the women endured 
sexual harassment, believing it was the only way to further their soccer careers).  See also 
Henderson, 469 F.3d at 479 (in which a coach threatened that if the players complained 
about him, their playing time would be cut). 
240 See supra note 111 (emphasizing the passive voice of Title IX, indicating the focus on 
the benefited class). 
241 See supra Part III.C (analyzing the details of the OCR’s responsibility under the 
Guidance).  
242 See generally Revised Guidance, supra note 20. 
243 See Jennings, 482 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 2007), cert denied, 128 S. Ct. 247 (2007) (the Supreme 
Court refused to decide the issue of actual notice in athletics). 
244 See supra Part II.A (explaining the legislative intent of Title IX and the role of the OCR 
in enforcing the statute). 
245 See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the current recommendations made by the OCR and 
the weaknesses inherent in any policy that focuses on reaction rather than prevention). 
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Proposed amendment to 34 C.F.R. 106.9:246 
(a) Notification of policy. (1) Each recipient shall 
implement specific and continuing steps to notify 
applicants for admission and employment, students and 
parents of elementary and secondary school students, 
employees, extracurricular activity directors or coaches, 
sources of referral of applicants for admission and 
employment, and all unions or professional 
organizations holding collective bargaining or 
professional agreements with the recipient, that it does 
not discriminate on the basis of sex in the educational 
program or activity which it operates, it does not permit 
sexual harassment of its students by employees or by other 
students, and that it is required by Title IX and this part 
not to discriminate or permit harassment in such a 
manner. Such notification shall contain such 
information, and be made in such manner, as the 
Assistant Secretary finds necessary to apprise such 
persons of the protections against discrimination or 
harassment assured them by Title IX and this part, but 
shall state at least that the requirement not to 
discriminate or harass in the education program or 
activity extends to employment therein, and to 
admission thereto unless Subpart C does not apply to 
the recipient, and that inquiries concerning the 
application of Title IX and this part to such recipient 
may be referred to the employee designated pursuant to 
§ 106.8, or to the Assistant Secretary. . . .  (3)  In addition 
to the aforementioned notification required in paragraphs 
(a)(2) and (b) of this section, following the distribution of the 
sexual harassment publication to every student and employee 
of such recipient, the Title IX coordinator for each recipient 
shall hold a seminar in which students, athletes, teachers or 
professors, coaches, and other employees are notified of specific 
individuals on staff who are qualified to receive reports of 
discrimination or harassment and provide guidance to 
students who are victims of sexual harassment or 
discrimination.  At this seminar, the Title IX coordinator shall 
also conduct sexual harassment awareness training for all 
                                                 
246 The language in regular font is taken from 34 C.F.R. 106.9.  The proposed additions, 
italicized, are the contributions of the author.   
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staff.  In addition, informal meetings shall be held at the start 
of every athletic season for the team, coaches, and other 
involved personnel regarding the unacceptability of player-
coach sexual relationships and the reporting procedure 
available in the event inappropriate sexual behavior is 
experienced or witnessed.  There shall be at least two (2) 
persons available who are outside the athletic office to receive 
such reports; these persons shall be made well-known to the 
athletes.  These persons shall also have their names and 
availabilities published and distributed to students, athletes, 
teachers, and other staff members.  All of this information 
shall be available in writing as well as imparted to the 
student-athletes during the seasonal meeting. 
Commentary 
 
The OCR is charged with enforcing Title IX against recipients of 
federal funds.247  The proposed additions and modifications to the OCR 
regulations address both the insufficient reporting mechanisms and the 
power imbalance inherent in athletics.248  First, by explicitly mentioning 
sexual harassment as a prohibited behavior, it encourages the 
establishment of institutional values and public awareness of the issue 
that will prevent the establishment of an environment vulnerable to 
sexual harassment.249  The proposed amendments also point to coaches 
and extracurricular directors as responsible parties for preventing sexual 
harassment.250  The wide-spread dissemination regarding the relevant 
parties to whom the student-athletes may report harassing behavior will 
accomplish the two-fold purpose of encouraging an environment 
focused on prevention and increasing the accessibility of officials for 
reporting purposes.251  Finally, by mandating training and information 
seminars, the Title IX coordinator will ensure that the school community 
understands what harassment is, that it will not be accepted, and how to 
prevent it.252  This increased effort on the part of the OCR, and in turn by 
individual schools, will work in conjunction with the second proposal of 
                                                 
247 See supra Part II.A (articulating the administrative regulations the OCR has passed in 
its attempts to enforce Title IX). 
248 See supra Part III.B (exploring the power imbalance); Part III.C (reviewing existing and 
OCR-recommended policies). 
249 See supra Part III.C (discussing the Revised Guidance). 
250 See supra Part II.C (explaining the creation of the actual notice standard); Part II.D 
(establishing the appropriate person to receive notice prong of the current standard).  
251 See supra Part III.B (exploring the power imbalances which can impede reporting 
mechanisms).  
252 See supra note 217 (the OCR suggests that a school may conduct training sessions). 
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this Note:  modifying the legal standard for establishing school liability 
in private litigation. 
B. Restoring Faith in Title IX:  Proposed Test for Determining School Liability  
This Note proposes the following modified test for school liability:253 
Only when a federal funding recipient knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known, and was 
deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment is that 
recipient liable for monetary damages.  In addition, the 
harassment must be so severe, pervasive, and or 
objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the 
victims of access to, or significantly reduce the victim’s 
access to, the educational opportunities or benefits 
provided by the school.   
Commentary 
 
The current Gebser standard for private litigation, as discussed above 
in Part II.B, utilizes an “actual notice” test that, when used in the 
athletics environment, precludes many reports of sexual harassment 
from triggering school liability for monetary damages.254  The proposed 
amended test, which should be adopted by the Supreme Court, 
incorporates the notice language used by the OCR in its Revised 
Standard.255  The standard for private litigation should be brought into 
line with the OCR agency enforcement scheme.  This adoption would 
impose on courts an obligation under Title IX to protect student-athletes 
from sexual harassment.256  Courts could then begin to interpret the law 
to ensure that federal funds recipients take reasonable steps to protect 
against and prevent sexual harassment.  OCR interprets its regulations to 
ensure that recipients take reasonable action to address, rather than 
neglect, reasonably obvious discrimination.257 
Next, the proposed standard states that significantly depriving a 
student-athlete of access to an educational opportunity is sufficient to 
trigger school liability.  A court’s final decision should not rest on 
                                                 
253 The language in regular font is taken from Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290 and Davis, 526 U.S. 
at 650.  The proposals are the contributions of the author.  Specifically, proposed additions 
are italicized and proposed deletions are struck through.   
254 See Parts III.B–C (analyzing the power imbalances in college athletics and the way in 
which this power structure inhibits direct reporting). 
255 See Revised Guidance, supra note 20. 
256 See supra Part II.A (discussing the original intent behind the passage of Title IX). 
257 See supra Parts III.B–C (examining the OCR regulations). 
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whether an athlete’s educational benefits have been completely denied 
or simply reduced.258  This is in line with the original goal of Title IX—to 
provide equal access and equal educational opportunities, regardless of 
gender.259 
In addition to these changes, the pool of persons that is to receive 
notice should be enlarged to include regular teachers, coaches, and other 
reasonable staff members.  Again, the guidelines given by the 
Department of Education provide a helpful starting point.  Under the 
Revised Guidance, the idea of who is a “responsible employee” is 
broader than the legal requirement of who is to receive notice.260  That is, 
even if a responsible employee is not empowered with the authority to 
address the discrimination and take corrective action, she still has an 
obligation to report it to the school officials with that power.261  Who a 
responsible employee is or whether it would be reasonable for a student-
athlete to believe that employee is responsible will vary depending on 
the type of position held by the employee, the relationship between the 
athlete and the employee, and school practices and procedures.262  This 
proposed change in the notice standard and in the severity of treatment 
needed to trigger school liability would remedy the weak Gebser 
standard so that it will be able to fulfill the original intent of Title IX as 
articulated by Senator Bayh.263 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Title IX has the potential to be a powerful tool to fight sexual 
harassment in college athletics.  However, courts have fashioned a 
standard in determining liability that simply does not accomplish what 
the legislature intended Title IX to do.  The power imbalances that exist 
in a college athletic department make the environment vulnerable to 
harassment and foster an environment in which it is difficult to find the 
proper person to whom harassment may be reported.  Because of these 
two problems, schools have focused on adopting reactive measures that 
comply with the Department of Education’s bare minimum regulations.  
                                                 
258 See supra Part II.C.3 (using specific cases to demonstrate the level of harassment that 
currently fulfills the Gebser standard). 
259 See supra Part II (tracking the betrayal of the original goal of Title IX). 
260 See Revised Guidance, supra note 20, at IV.C.  
261 See supra Part III (analyzing the problems the current version of the Gebser standard 
has created with the “actual notice” standard, in that it eliminates most of the school staff—
to whom an athlete is likely to report sexual harassment—from being able to receive 
notice).  
262 See Revised Guidance, supra note 20, at n.74. 
263 See supra Part II.A (discussing legislative intent of Title IX); Part II.C (articulating the 
current Gebser standard); Part II.D (clarifying the standard in Davis). 
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Colleges and universities need to take a more active role in preventing 
sexual harassment, in protecting their athletes, and in informing the 
entire community of a general intolerance for any form of sexual 
harassment.  In addition, the standard should be relaxed, and the 
Department of Education should promulgate additional regulations for 
the prevention of sexual harassment.  Title IX is not dead, it just needs a 
little breath of fresh air. 
Let us return to the star softball pitcher introduced in Part I of this 
Note, who has been left alone to deal with her injuries.  With the 
proposed improvements and additions to Title IX, our pitcher would be 
secure in knowing to whom she should report her coach’s harassing 
behavior.  In addition, and perhaps most importantly, this improved 
sexual harassment prevention plan would stop the coach from ever 
harassing her because the team would exist in a community where it is 
clear that sexual harassment will not be tolerated.  Finally, if all 
preventative measures fail, our pitcher could receive an injunctive order 
from the court, and the school would be liable to our pitcher for 
monetary damages because it had notice of the harassment and failed to 
act. Courts have watered down Title IX, and when that weakened 
standard combines with the power imbalances inherent in the college 
athletic world, schools are able to dodge legal liability by promulgating 
minimal reactive regulations.  Additional regulations are needed, and 
school prevention plans should be required so that Title IX may once 
again protect student athletes. 
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